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Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to
solving deduction constraints expressing whether an instance of a
given message pattern can be constructed by the intruder. Most
constraint solving procedures for protocol security rely on two
properties of constraint systems called monotonicity and variable-
origination. In this work we relax these restrictions by giving a
decision procedure for solving general intruder constraints (that do
not have these properties) that stays in NP. The result is also valid
modulo an associative, commutative and idempotent theory. The
procedure can be applied to verify security protocols in presence
of multiple intruders.
1. Introduction
Detecting flaws in security protocol specifications under the perfect cryptography assumption 
in the Dolev–Yao intruder model is an approach that has been extensively investigated in recent 
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years (Armando et al., 2014; Groza and Minea, 2013; Viganò, 2012; Meadows, 2011; Blanchet, 2009;
Guttman, 2007; Arapinis and Duflot, 2007; Turuani, 2006). In particular, symbolic constraint solving 
has proved to be a very successful approach in the area. It amounts to expressing the possibility of 
mounting an attack, e.g. the derivation of a secret, as a list of steps where for each step an instance 
of the message pattern awaited according to the protocol has to be derived from the current intruder 
knowledge. These steps correspond in general to the progression of the protocol execution, up to the 
last one which is the secret derivation.
Enriching the standard Dolev–Yao intruder model with different equational theories (Comon-Lundh 
and Shmatikov, 2003; Comon-Lundh, 2004; Basin et al., 2005; Chevalier and Rusinowitch, 2010;
Baskar et al., 2010; Escobar et al., 2011) like exclusive OR, modular exponentiation, Abelian groups, 
etc. (Liu and Lynch, 2011; Erbatur et al., 2011; Malladi, 2012; Chevalier et al., 2005; Küsters and 
Truderung, 2008) helps to find flaws that could not be detected considering free symbols only. 
A particularly useful theory is the theory of an ACI operator (that is associative, commutative and 
idempotent) since it allows one to express sets in cryptographic protocols.
Up to the exception of Mazaré (2005), all proposed algorithms rely on two strong assumptions 
about the constraints to be processed:
• knowledge monotonicity, reflecting the fact that the intruder could see everything that occurred
before and forgot nothing;
• variable origination, reflecting that each variation in the protocol is introduced by the intruder.
Constraints satisfying these hypotheses are called well-formed constraints in the literature. Well-formed 
constraints are sufficient to solve security problems in the standard case where a single Dolev–Yao 
intruder is assumed. However, we will see that in some situations it can be quite useful to relax these 
hypotheses and consider general constraints, that is constraints without the restrictions above. General 
constraints naturally occur when considering security problems involving several non-communicating 
Dolev–Yao intruders (see § 2.1). Note that if intruders can communicate during protocol execution, 
the model becomes attack-equivalent to one with a unique Dolev–Yao intruder (Syverson et al., 2000). 
A discussion on a multiple non-collaborating attackers model as well as interesting examples can be 
found in Fiazza et al. (2012).
1.1. Contributions of the paper
First, we will show that as for the standard case, in this more general framework it is still possible 
to derive an NP decision procedure for detecting attacks on a bounded number of protocol sessions 
(Sections 5, 4). Second, our result extends previous ones by allowing non-atomic keys (which is an 
important feature for protocol design as it is common to build symmetric keys from shared secrets) 
and the usage of an associative commutative idempotent operator (Sections 3, 4) that can be used for 
instance to model sets of nodes in XML document (see § 2.2). This extension of well-formed constraint 
systems may seem trivial but a third contribution of this paper is to demonstrate this is not the case 
by considering subterm deduction systems which are akin to the Dolev–Yao deduction system, but in 
which the equational theory can be any subterm convergent one. Whereas the decidability of well-
formed constraint systems for subterm deduction systems is well known, see e.g. Baudet (2005), we 
prove in Appendix A that the satisfiability of general constraint systems is not decidable for subterm 
deduction systems. Finally we will sketch several applications of our results to security analysis in 
Section 2.
1.2. Related work
The decision procedure for satisfiability of well-formed constraint systems can be used to decide 
the insecurity of cryptographic protocols with a bounded number of sessions (Rusinowitch and Tu-
ruani, 2003). In this domain, several works deviated from the perfect cryptography assumption and 
started to consider algebraic properties of functional symbols. For example properties of XOR opera-
tor and exponentiation were considered in Lynch and Meadows (2004), Chevalier et al. (2005, 2008), 
Dougherty and Guttman (2013) and together with homomorphic symbol in Delaune (2006). A class of 
monoidal equational theories was studied in Delaune et al. (2008) including the ACUI theory which 
is quite similar to the ACI theory discussed in the present work, but the absence of a unit element 
in ACI seems to put the ACI theory out of scope of their method. Moreover Delaune et al. (2008) do
not show the NP complexity of their procedure. We note that in Chevalier et al. (2007) the authors 
showed the NP-completeness for the AC theory, while Dolev–Yao deduction system was extended 
with a rule x · y → x, where · is an AC symbol. We will examine the ACI theory within the similar 
deduction system. Note also that some algebraic properties (like associative and commutative symbol) 
make the insecurity problem undecidable (Bursuc et al., 2007).
All the decidability results mentioned above consider systems of constraints with two restrictions 
namely knowledge monotonicity (the left-hand side of a constraint representing the current knowl-
edge of the intruder is included into the left-hand side of the next one) and variable origination 
(variable appears first in the right-hand side of some constraint): this limitation is not impeding the 
solution of usual protocol insecurity problems since the constraints generated with an active Dolev–
Yao intruder are of the required type. An attempt to swerve from well-formed constraints was made in 
Mazaré (2005) where the knowledge monotonicity was relaxed to define “quasi well-formed” whose 
satisfiability is proven to be in NP. This result was later extended in Mazaré (2006) to general con-
straint systems but under the provision that all keys are atomic, an hypothesis that permits to guess 
at the start of the procedure which keys are available at which step to the intruder. However to our 
knowledge no extension of Dolev–Yao deduction system to non-atomic symmetric key or to algebraic 
properties has been shown decidable for general constraint systems. Moreover, satisfiability of well-
formed constraints with the ACI theory was not considered before. We have presented our results 
without proofs in a conference paper (Avanesov et al., 2010). In this long version we give detailed 
proofs. We believe that they can be useful for readers that want to study general constraints for other 
intruder theories.
2. Motivating examples
2.1. Protocol analysis with several intruders
Security analysis of a protocol is usually conducted in the worst possible case: a single intruder
(or a coalition of several intruders, but able to share information faster than normal communications) 
controls all the network. However some protocols, especially routing protocols, are designed to work 
through different, non-communicating sub-networks. A relevant analysis of such protocols must take 
into account that the security of the protocol depends on the (correct) assumption that some com-
munications are not possible. In these cases one needs to consider a less powerful intruder, or rather 
a collection thereof, that still controls some parts of the network but remains completely ignorant of 
what happens in other parts.
Suppose several agents (A, B . . . , see Fig. 1) execute a protocol i.e. a specified finite sequence 
of message emissions or receptions. Due to their (long distance) layout they have to transmit data 
through routers (1, 2, 3 . . . ). The routing tables of all honest routers/agents are static (messages follow 
always the same path). Some routers (2, 5, 7) may be compromised: an intruder managed to install a 
device controlling input and output of the router or implanted there his malicious code. A message 
circulated via such an untrusted channel (e.g. DB) is consumed by the corresponding compromised 
device (local intruder) (7) thereby increasing his knowledge. Moreover, a local intruder can forge and 
emit to an endpoint (C, B, D) of any channel he controls (BD, DB, DC ) any message he can build 
using the content of his memory and some available transformations specified by a deduction system. 
Because of the network topology malicious routers have no means to communicate (there are no links 
between them, neither direct nor via other routers), but at some point the intruder can gather the 
knowledge of all the compromised routers (by physically collecting devices or reading their memory).
In this framework the Coordinated attack problem is to decide whether it is possible to initially give 
instructions to compromised routers (e.g. by reprogramming malicious devices) to force an execution 
such that honest agents following the protocol will reveal some secret data to the intruder (i.e. the 
intruder can deduce it using information collected at the end from all local intruders).
Fig. 1. Untrusted routers.
2.1.1. The coordinated attack problem
We give here a semi-formal description of the problem and some directions to solve it. A formal 
model can be found in Avanesov et al. (2010) or Avanesov (2011).
First we introduce some notations and definitions that will be detailed in the technical part of the 
paper (§ 3).
2.1.1.1. Messages We consider messages as first-order terms built from a set of function symbols (such 
as encryption, pairing, etc.), a set of constants A (representing elementary pieces of data: texts, public 
keys, names of agents, etc) and a set of variables X . Let T be the set of all possible terms. For a term 
t we denote by Vars (t) the set of all variables in t . A term t is a ground term, if Vars (t)= ∅. The set 
of ground terms is denoted by Tg .
We define a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} (where xi ∈X and ti ∈ T ) to be the mapping 
σ : T → T , such that tσ is a term obtained by replacing, for all i, each occurrence of a variable xi by 
the corresponding term ti . If T ⊆ T , then by definition Tσ = {tσ : t ∈ T }. A substitution σ is ground
if for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, ti is ground.
2.1.1.2. Agents We will call honest communicating parties agents. Every agent is identified by its 
name. We denote the set of agent names by A.
2.1.1.3. Channels Any two agents a and b communicate through a directed channel a ⇀ b imple-
mented as a queue. The sent messages are stored in a queue to be processed in order of arrival.
2.1.1.4. Agents’ behavior Each agent has a specific sequence of actions to execute. Every action is either 
of reception type ? f r (expecting a message r from agent f ) or emission type !t s (sending a message 
s to an agent with name t). Here r and s are terms representing message patterns. For example, if the 
sequence of actions of agent a is ?b aenc (X, pka) , !c aenc (X, pkc) (where X is a variable and pka, pkc
are constants denoting a public key of a and a public key of c correspondingly and aenc (u, v) is an 
asymmetric encryption of u with key v) then a waits until he/she receives some message t matching 
a pattern aenc (X, pka) on a channel b ⇀ a and sends a message aenc (Xσ , pkb) on channel a ⇀ c, 
where σ is a substitution satisfying t = aenc (X, pka)σ . For instance, if a receives aenc (s, pka), i.e. 
some atomic value s asymmetrically encrypted with a public key of a pka , then the corresponding 
substitution σ is {X 7→ s} and a sends to c the value of s reencrypted with public key pkc of c. On the 
other hand, it could be σ = {X 7→ pair (b, s)} if b sent aenc (pair (b, s) , pka). Note that if the message 
does not match the expected pattern, the agent stops this execution. Once a variable is instantiated 
on a reception, its value can be used in the following agent actions.
Table 1
DY deduction rules.
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → enc (t1, t2) enc (t1, t2) , t2 → t1
t1, t2 → aenc (t1, t2) aenc (t1, t2) ,priv (t2)→ t1
t1, t2 → pair (t1, t2) pair (t1, t2)→ t1
t1,priv (t2)→ sig (t1,priv (t2)) pair (t1, t2)→ t2
2.1.1.5. Intruder model We assume that some communication channels are controlled by N local in-
truders from a set I = {I i}i=1,...,N and no channel is controlled by more than one intruder. Given some 
channel c, we denote by ι(c) the local intruder that controls c when there is one.
Every intruder I is given some initial knowledge K 0I that is a set of ground terms. Once an agent 
sends a message via a channel controlled by an intruder, the intruder reads it and blocks it. Reading 
the message means extending intruder’s current knowledge with this message. An intruder control-
ling a channel can generate a message from his knowledge using deduction rules and send it to its 
endpoint.
We now specify the intruder capabilities.
Definition 2.1. A rule is a tuple of terms written as s1, . . . , sk → s, where s1, . . . , sk, s are terms. A de-
duction system D is a set of rules.
As an example of deduction system, we refer to a version of the classical Dolev–Yao deduction 
system (DY) presented in Table 1.
From now to the end of this section rules are assumed to belong to a fixed deduction system D
and that terms are evaluated modulo a congruence on terms ≡E by an equational theory (a set of 
equations between terms together with the properties of equality) E .
Given two sets of ground terms E , F and a rule l → r, we write E →l→r F iff F = E ∪ {s}, s ≡E r
and l ⊆ E , where l is a set of terms. We write E → F iff there exists rule l → r such that E →l→r F .
Definition 2.2. A derivation D is a finite sequence of finite sets of ground terms E0, E1, . . . , En such 
that E0 → E1 → ·· ·→ En , where E i = E i−1 ∪ {ti}, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. A term t is derivable modulo an 
equational theory E from a set of terms E iff there exists a derivation D = E0, . . . , En such that E0 = E
and there exists s ∈ En such that s ≡E t . We denote by derE (E) the set of terms derivable from E
modulo E . A set of terms T is derivable from E , iff T ⊆ derE (E).
When the equational theory E is clear from context we write Der (E) instead of derE (E), and sim-
ilarly omit any reference to it. Informally, a local intruder may build new messages from the messages 
he knows by applying the deduction rules (e.g. concatenate two messages he knows). At each step a 
local intruder having recorded messages t1, . . . , tn can send a message m if m ∈ Der ({t1, . . . , tn}).
2.1.1.6. Protocol execution Given a set of protocol participants (agents) with their sequences of actions 
to execute, communication channels and local intruders each one with some initial knowledge, the 
course of events develops as follows. Each agent access channels connecting her to other agents. To 
send a message to Bob Alice inserts the message in the queue representing the channel, and to receive 
it Bob takes the first message in the queue and matches it against the pattern of the awaited message. 
An intruder Charlie controlling the channel may add, remove, read or reorder as he wishes messages 
in the queue.
2.1.1.7. Oﬄine communication At some execution point initially specified, the current knowledge of all 
local intruders is shared in order to derive a secret which probably they cannot deduce separately. We 
consider our intruder model is reasonable for covering situations where oﬄine interactions between 
intruders are time-consuming and may be detected and therefore they take place when the protocol 
is over, when the honest agents have finished to execute their roles.
2.1.1.8. Coordinated attack problem We are now able to define what is an attack by several local in-
truders on a protocol.
Coordinated attack problem (CAP)
Input: A finite set of agents A, list of actions per agent {〈a, la〉}a∈A , a set of local intruders I =
{I i}i=1,...,N each with initial knowledge K
0
I i
, and a partial function ι that assigns at most one in-
truder ι(c) to each channel c and some sensitive data given as a ground term s.
Output: Yes iff there is a sequence of actions performed by agents and local intruders such that, at 
some point, from the union of intruders knowledge it is possible to derive s.
2.1.2. Reduction of the CAP to the satisfiability of a constraint system
We sketch in this section a non-deterministic reduction of the coordinated attack problem to the 
satisfiability of a constraint system. Briefly put, this reduction guesses an ordering of messages sent 
and received by the agents. Each intruder diverts all the messages put in a queue he has access to, 
and all messages received by agents are actually sent by the intruder. A guessed execution may be in-
feasible if the algorithm guesses an ordering in which an intruder who must send a message is unable 
to construct a message matching the awaited message pattern. We thus introduce constraints impos-
ing that given a set E of messages known by an intruder, he has to construct a message matching a 
pattern t .
Definition 2.3. Let E be an equational theory, E be a set of terms and t be a term. We define the 
couple (E, t) denoted E ✄ t to be a constraint modulo E . A constraint system modulo E is a set
S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n
where n is a non-negative integer and E i ✄ ti is a constraint modulo E for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A ground substitution σ is a model of constraint modulo E E ✄ t (or σ satisfies this constraint) if 
tσ ∈ Der (Eσ ). A ground substitution σ is a model of a constraint system S modulo E if it satisfies 
all the constraints of S . In order to simplify notations, when the equational theory E is clear from 
context we will omit any reference to it.
To express the problem with constraints we first guess an order in which the agents execute their 
actions since several interleavings are possible. Once the order is fixed, we build the constraint system 
S (initially empty) incrementally by progressing in the action list:
• Agent a executes !bt on channel a ⇀ b:
· if a ⇀ b is controlled by I we increase the knowledge of Intruder I with t by setting K I :=
K I ∪ {t};
· otherwise we put t directly in the channel queue.
• Agent a executes ?bt on channel b ⇀ a:
· if b ⇀ a is controlled by I we add a constraint K I ✄ t into S expressing the fact that Intruder
I knowing K I must send a message compatible with the expected message pattern t;
· otherwise we must ensure that the first message m in the queue of b ⇀ a is compatible with
the expected pattern t , i.e. mσ = tσ , where σ is a ground substitution satisfying all other con-
straints in S . For the case of DY deduction system we can encode this equation by a constraint
{enc (m,k)} ✄ enc (t,k) for some atom k1 since we can prove they admit the same solutions.
We add the constraint to S and remove m from the queue.
Finally, we add (
⋃
I∈I K I ) ✄ s to S which expresses the oﬄine communication phase: Secret s can be 
deduced from the union of local intruders knowledge.
It is clear that if there exists a substitution σ that satisfies S then CAP has a solution. Conversely 
an attack for the CAP orders and instantiates the message patterns in the description of the protocol 
with a substitution σ , which satisfies the constraint system constructed as above.
1 For different deduction systems and equational theories the encoding may vary.
Fig. 2. Example illustrations.
We give an example below and will show in Sections 3 and 4 that the satisfiability of constraint 
systems is in NP in the case of the Dolev–Yao deduction theory and its extension with an associative-
commutative idempotent operator. This kind of operator can be useful to model messages in XML 
format as is shown in next subsection.
2.1.3. Example
Suppose three agents a, b, c execute a protocol whose normal execution is shown in Fig. 2(a). Each 
agent follows his sequence of actions shown in Fig. 2(b). Agent a wants to send a secret s to b. He 
asks b to send her public key kb to c, that will forward it to a. Nonce n permits a to correlate the 
message from c with his request.
The agents are connected by three directed channels: channel a ⇀ b is controlled by local in-
truder I1 , channel b ⇀ c is controlled by local intruder I2 , while channel c ⇀ a is secure (free from 
intruders).
We assume that the two local intruders have as initial knowledge a pair of fresh public/private 
keys and public keys of all participants: K 0I1 = K
0
I2
= {ki,priv (ki) ,ka,kb,kc}.
The question we ask is whether the local intruders I1 and I2 can cooperate in such a way that 
joining their final knowledge they can derive s, although they have no means to communicate during 
the protocol execution.
Following the sequence of actions shown in Fig. 2(a), we obtain the constraint system shown 
in Fig. 2(c). First a sends n which is intercepted by I1 . The knowledge of I1 becomes K I1 = K
0
I1
∪ {n}. 
Then I1 must build from his knowledge a message that can be accepted by b. This is expressed in (1). 
Once b accepts this message, he executes his next action: emission of a message on channel b ⇀ c. 
This message is intercepted by I2 and his knowledge becomes K I2 = K
0
I2
∪ {aenc (pair (Y ,kb) ,kc)}. 
Now, I2 must send a message to c on behalf of b (2). Then c accepts a message sent by I2 , 
it sends his reply to a which should be compatible with the expected pattern: enc (Z ,kac) =
enc (pair (n, X) ,kac). This fact is encoded into (3). Then a sends a message to b intercepted by I1
(K I1 = K
0
I1
∪ {n,aenc (s, X)}) and I1 must generate a message acceptable by b (4). Finally, in (5) we 
specify that from the common knowledge of I1 and I2 one may deduce a secret s.
The obtained constraint system has no solution as well as any other constraint systems generated 
from different interleaving of actions executed by the agents. We conclude that there is no coordi-
nated attack under the given hypothesis. On the other hand, if I1 and I2 can communicate, or the 
same intruder controls both channels a ⇀ b and b ⇀ c, a simple attack can be mounted: once the 
intruder receives n on channel a ⇀ b, he generates the message aenc (pair (n,ki) ,kc) and sends it via 
b ⇀ c; c accepts it and sends message enc (pair (n,ki) ,kac) to a which matches the expected pattern. 
Thus, a will send via a ⇀ b a message aenc (s,ki) which is intercepted by the intruder and can be 
decomposed using priv (ki). The intruder can also finalize the actions of b by sending him, e.g., n and 
then aenc (s,kb).
Fig. 3. Ordering an item scenario.
2.2. Attacks exploiting XML format of messages
We propose a way to model some attacks based on an XML-representation of messages. A different 
technique to handle this kind of attacks was presented in Chevalier et al. (2007) which considers 
multisets of XML nodes, while in this work the notion of set is taken as a basis.
We consider an e-shop that accepts e-cheques, and we suppose that it is presented by a Web 
Service using the SOAP protocol for exchanging messages.
It consists of two services:
(1) the first exposes the list of goods for sale with their prices and processes the orders by accepting
payment;
(2) the second is a delivery service; it receives information from the first one about successfully paid
orders, and sends the ordered goods to the buyer.
A simple scenario for ordering items is shown in Fig. 3. First, a client sends an order using the 
e-shop interface that consists of an item identifier, e-cheque, delivery address and some comments.
Then, the first service of the e-shop checks whether the price of the ordered item corresponds to the
received cheque. If it does, the service consumes the cheque and forwards the order to the stock-
/delivery service (without the used e-cheque). Stock and Delivery service prepares a parcel for the
ordered item and sends it to given address. The comment is automatically printed on the parcel to
give some information to the postman about, for example, delivery time or access instructions.
Suppose Alice has an e-cheque for 5e. She can buy a simple pen (with ItemID simple) but she 
likes very much a more expensive gilded one (with ItemID gilded). Can we help Alice to get what she 
wants for what she has?
Let us formalize the behavior of scenario players. We will write (t1 · . . . · tn) (or equivalently 
· (t1, . . . , tn)) an XML message where t1, . . . , tn are XML nodes. We model the fact that the nodes
are not duplicated and their order is meaningless by assuming that · is associative commuta-
tive and idempotent. Identifiers starting with a capital letter are considered as variables; numbers
and identifier starting from lower-case letter are considered as constants. We model a delivery of
item with some ItemID to address Address with comments Comments by the following message:
sig ((ItemID ·Address ·Comments),priv (ks)) — a message signature produced by e-shop, where ks its
public key and priv (ks) is the corresponding private key, such that no one can produce this message
except the shop. We abstract away from the procedure of checking the item price and will suppose
that Shop Interface expects a 5e e-cheque for Item “simple”. For simplicity we assume only two
items.
We will use the same notation as in § 2.1 for emission and reception actions.
For Shop Interface we have:
?Client(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm);
!Delivery(simple · IAddr · IComm).
For Shop Stock/Delivery we have:
?Interface(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm);
!Client sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks)) .
Alice initially has:
simple,gilded: identifiers of items;
cheque5: an e-cheque for 5e;
addr: her address;
cmnts: residence digital code;
ks: a public key of the shop.
Now we build a mixed constraint system (derivation constraints and equations) to know whether 
Alice can do what she wants:

{gilded, simple, cheque5,addr, cmnts,ks} ✄
(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm)
(simple · IAddr · IComm)=ACI (DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm)
{gilded, simple, cheque5,addr, cmnts,ks,
sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm),priv (ks))}✄
sig ((gilded ·addr ·DComm),priv (ks))


(6)
(7)
(8)
The constraint (6) shows that Alice can construct a message expected by the shop from a client. 
Constraint (7) represents a request from the first to the second service of the shop: the left-hand 
side is a message sent by the interface service and the right-hand side is a message expected by the 
stock/delivery subservice; ≡ACI means that these messages must be compatible (modulo ACI). The last 
constraint shows that from the received values Alice can build a message that models a delivery of 
item with ItemID gilded.
To solve it, we first get rid of syntactic equations by applying the most general unifier; and then 
of equations modulo ACI (t1 =ACI t2) by encoding them into a deducibility constraint (as it was done 
in § 2.1.2).
Then, one of the solutions is:
IAddr 7→addr IComm 7→(gilded · cmnts)
DItemID 7→gilded DAddr 7→addr
DComm 7→(simple · cmnts)
From this solution we see that Alice can send an ill-formed comment (that contains two 
XML-nodes), and the Delivery service parser can choose an entry with ID gilded. An attack-request 
can look like this:
<ItemID>simple< / ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5< / Cheque>
<Address>addr< / Address>
<Comments>cmnts< /Comments>
<ItemID>gilded< / ItemID>
The parser of the first service can return the value of the first occurrence of ItemID: <ItemID>
simple</ItemID>, while the parser of the second one, being a different software, can return <ItemID
>gilded</ItemID>.
This attack is possible if Alice constructs a request “by hand”, but a similar attack is probably
feasible using an XML-injection: Alice when filling a request form enters instead of her comments the 
following string:
cmnts< /Comments>
<ItemID>gilded< / ItemID><Comments>
and in the resulting request we get:
<ItemID>simple< / ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5< / Cheque>
<Address>addr< / Address>
<Comments>cmnts< /Comments>
<ItemID>gilded< / ItemID><Comments>
< /Comments>
This kind of XML-injection attack was described in OWASP Foundation (2008).
3. Satisfiability of general DY+ ACI constraint systems
In Section 2 we have shown how to reduce the problem of protocol insecurity in presence of 
several intruders to solving a system of general deducibility constraints. In this section we present 
a decision procedure for the satisfiability of general constraint systems where the Dolev–Yao de-
duction system is extended with some deduction rules for an associative-commutative-idempotent 
symbol (DY+ ACI). We consider operators for pairing, symmetric and asymmetric encryptions, signa-
ture, hashing and an ACI operator that will be used as a set constructor.
As for the proof structure, after introducing the formal notations and some basic properties, the 
main steps to show the decidability are as follows:
(1) We present an algorithm for solving the derivability problem in the DY+ ACI model;
(2) We prove that for checking intruder constraints satisfiability it is sufficient to consider normalized
constraints and normalized substitutions;
(3) We show that a satisfiable normalized constraint system admits at least one conservative solution,
that is a substitution σ that maps each variable of the constraint system to a set of subterms from
the constraint system (instantiated with σ ) and private keys;
(4) We give a bound on the size of a conservative solution, and, as a consequence, we obtain decid-
ability.
3.1. Formal introduction to the problem
First we would like to note that we omit the proofs of some statements that we find intuitive. 
In any case the detailed proofs may be found in Avanesov (2011) (particularly in Lemma 4, p. 33). 
Though the notions of terms and subterms are standard in the litterature, they are not necessarily the 
most convenient when working with equational theories. Accordingly, in this section and in addition 
to the standard notions, we introduce the sets of Subterms and Quasi-subterms of a term. The notion 
of subterm of a term t is the standard one, whereas quasi-subterms are subterms of the flattening 
of t by successive applications of associativity rules. The notions of subterms and quasi-subterms 
are equivalent on normalized terms, but one of the difficulty of handling an equational theory is to 
analyze their interplay when instantiating and normalizing a term modulo this equational theory. We 
also provide a few technical lemmas to address this question in this subsection.
Definition 3.1. Let A be a set of atoms, and X be a set of variables. Let F be the minimal set 
of functional symbols containing: binary symbols pair, enc, aenc, sig, apply, ·2 , unary symbols priv, ·1 , 
and for all i ∈ N+ an i-nary symbol ·i . The set of terms T (A, X ) is a minimal set satisfying: A ⊆ T , 
X ⊆ T , if t1, . . . , tk are terms and f is a k-ary symbol from F then f (t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T . To be short we 
write T instead of T (A, X ).
By sig (p,priv (a)) we mean a signature of message p with private key priv (a) that does not con-
tain a message itself (the message p together with its signature with private key priv (a) can be 
modeled as pair (p, sig (p,priv (a)))).
We consider the following family of function symbols (indexed by their fixed arities): 
⋃
i∈N+ {·i}. 
Symbol ·i has a list of i terms as its arguments. Since the arity can be inferred from the number of 
arguments, we write · (t1, t2) as a shortcut for ·2(t1, t2), · (t1, t2, t3) as a shortcut for ·3(t1, t2, t3) and 
so on.
We denote dom (σ ) the domain {x1, . . . , xn} of a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn} and
img (σ )= dom (σ )σ =
⋃
x∈dom(σ ) {xσ } its image. The cardinality of a set P is denoted by |P |.
We denote bin any element of {enc, aenc, pair, sig, apply}. The root of a term t ∈ T is denoted 
root (t) and is defined as follows:
root (t)=


bin, if t = bin (p,q) ;
·, if t = · (L) ;
priv, if t = priv (p) ;
t, if t ∈X ∪A.
We denote the i-th term of a list of terms L as L[i] and we write t ∈ L if t occurs as an element 
of L. We also define two binary relations ⊆ and ≈ on lists as follows: L1 ⊆ L2 iff every element of L1
is an element of L2; L1 ≈ L2 iff L1 ⊆ L2 and L2 ⊆ L1 (we use the same definition if L1 or L2 is a set).
In Definition 3.2 we present algebraic properties of the · symbol (denoted as AC I), that are consid-
ered together with the Dolev–Yao deduction system in this section. In the rest of this paper deduction 
constraints are always modulo this ACI equational theory.
Definition 3.2. We define ≡AC I to be the congruence relation on T generated by the equational the-
ory AC I:
{· (y)= y, · (y1, y1)= · (y1) , · (y1, y2)= · (y2, y1)}∪⋃∞
n=1
{
·
(
t1, . . . , tk, ·
(
tk+1, . . . , tm
)
, tm+1, . . . , tn
)
= · (t1, . . . , tn)
}
0≤k<m≤n
.
Since · is variadic, the associativity property is expressed above as an infinite set of flattening rules.
Definition 3.3. The set of elements of a term t ∈ T is denoted elems (t) and defined by:
elems (t)=
{⋃
p∈L elems (p) if t = · (L) ;
{t} , otherwise.
We extend elems () to sets of terms or lists of terms T by elems (T )=
⋃
t∈T elems (t).
Example 1. The set of elements of t = · (a, · (b,a,pair (a,b)) ,pair (· (b,b) ,a)) is elems (t) = {a, b, pair
(· (b,b) ,a) , pair (a,b)}.
Definition 3.4. Let ≺ be a strict total order on T such that the question whether p ≺ q can be an-
swered in polynomial time.
Definition 3.5. The normal form of a term t (denoted by ptq) and a set of terms T (denoted by pTq) 
is defined in a mutually recursive way (on their size) by:
(1) ptq= t , if t ∈X ∪A;
(2) pbin (t1, t2)q= bin (pt1q ,pt2q);
(3) ppriv (t)q= priv (ptq);
(4) p· (L)q=


·
(
L′
)
, if |pelems (L)q|> 1 and L′ ≈ pelems (L)q
and for all i < j, L′[i] ≺ L′[ j];
t′, if pelems (L)q=
{
t′
}
(5) pTq= {ptq : t ∈ T }
We say a term t is normalized iff t = ptq.
We note right away that |Tσ | ≤ |T | and |pTq| ≤ |T | and two terms are congruent modulo the
ACI properties of ′′.′′ iff they have the same normal form. In particular the following equalities hold: 
p· (t, t)q= ptq, p· (t1, t2)q= p· (t2, t1)q, p· (· (t1, t2) , t3)q= p· (t1, · (t2, t3))q= p· (t1, t2, t3)q.
Note also that normalization is idempotent: pptqq= ptq. Moreover the equivalence relation ≡AC I is 
closed under substitution (see Baader and Nipkow, 1998), i.e. t1 ≡AC I t2 implies t1σ ≡AC I t2σ . Therefore, 
we obtain t ≡AC I ptq and tσ ≡AC I ptqσ , and then ptσq = pptqσq. Furthermore ptσq = pptqσq =
pt pσqq= pptqpσqq.
Given its importance we turn this last property into a lemma.
Lemma 1. For any term t and substitution σ we have ptσq= pptqpσqq.
Example 2. In Example 1 we have ptq= · ({a,b,pair (a,b) ,pair (b,a)}).
We give some useful properties of elems (·) function with respect to normalization.
Lemma 2. For any term t, pelems (t)q= elems (ptq).
Proof. This statement is trivial, if t 6= · (L). Otherwise, let t = · (t1, . . . , tn).
(1) If pelems (t)q = {p}, where p 6= ·
(
Lp
)
. Then ptq = p and then elems (ptq) = elems (p) = {p} =
pelems (t)q;
(2) If pelems (t)q = {p1, . . . , pk}, k > 1, where pi 6= · (Li) for all i. Then ptq = · (L), where L ≈
{p1, . . . , pk}. That means that elems (ptq)=
⋃
p∈{p1,...,pk}
elems (p)= {p1, . . . , pk}. ✷
Lemma 3. For any terms t1, . . . , tm , we have p· (pt1q , . . . ,ptmq)q= p· (t1, . . . , tm)q
Proof. Follows from the definition of normal form and Lemma 2. ✷
Lemma 4. For terms t1, . . . , tm , we have:
elems (p· (pt1q , . . . ,ptmq)q)= elems (· (pt1q , . . . ,ptmq))=
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ptiq)
Proof. We get the first equality by applying Lemma 2: elems (p· (pt1q , . . . ,ptmq)q) = pelems(·(pt1q,
. . . , ptmq))q and then from Definition 3.3 and Lemma 2 we have that elems (· (pt1q , . . . ,ptmq)) is a 
set of normalized terms. The second equality directly follows from Definition 3.3. ✷
We introduce now quasi − subterms as subterms of terms flattened by applications of associativity 
rules.
Definition 3.6. The set of quasi-subterms of term t is defined as follows:
QSub (t)=


{t}, if t ∈X ∪A;
{t} ∪ QSub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪ QSub (t1)∪ QSub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2) ;
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(L)QSub (p) , if t = · (L)
If T is a set of terms then QSub (T )=
⋃
t∈T QSub (t). If S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n is a constraint system then 
QSub (S)=
⋃
t∈
⋃n
i=1 E i∪{ti}
QSub (t).
Example 3. Referring to Example 1, we have
QSub (t)= {· (a, · (b,a,pair (a,b)) ,pair (· (b,b) ,a)) ,a,b,pair (a,b) ,pair (· (b,b) ,a) , · (b,b)}.
Note also that QSub (QSub (t))= QSub (t) and s = psq for all s ∈ QSub (ptq).
Let us now define the set Sub(t) of subterms of a term t .
Definition 3.7. Let t be a term. We define Sub (t) as follows:
Sub (t)=


{t}, if t ∈X ∪A;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1)∪ Sub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2) ;
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈L Sub (p) , if t = · (L) .
If T is a set of terms, then Sub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T Sub (t). If S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n is a constraint system, we 
define Sub (S)=
⋃
t∈
⋃n
i=1 E i∪{ti}
Sub (t).
Example 4. Referring to Example 1, we have
Sub (t)= QSub (t)∪ {· (b,a,pair (a,b))}.
Lemma 5. For any term t and substitution σ , Sub (tσ )= Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ ).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|
• |Sub (t)| = 1.
· t ∈A. As tσ = t and Vars (t)= ∅, the statement becomes trivial;
· t ∈ X . Then Sub (t)σ = tσ , Vars (t) = {t}; and as for any term p, p ∈ Sub (p), we have
Sub (tσ )= {tσ } ∪ Sub (tσ ).
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k ≥ 1), the statement is true;
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible cases:
· t = bin (t1, t2). Then tσ = bin (t1σ , t2σ ) and Vars (t) = Vars (t1) ∪ Vars (t2). Sub (tσ ) = {tσ } ∪
Sub (t1σ ) ∪ Sub (t2σ ) = (as |Sub (ti)| < k) = {tσ } ∪ Sub (t1)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t1)σ ) ∪ Sub (t2)σ ∪
Sub (Vars (t2)σ ) = {tσ } ∪ Sub (t1)σ ∪ Sub (t2)σ ∪ Sub ((Vars (t1)∪ Vars (t2))σ ) = Sub (t)σ ∪
Sub (Vars (t)σ );
· t = priv (t1). The proof is the same as for the previous case;
· t = · (t1, . . . , tm). Then tσ = · (t1σ , . . . , tmσ ) and Vars (t) =
⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti). Then we have 
Sub (tσ ) = {tσ } ∪
⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (tiσ ) = (as |Sub (ti)| < k) = {tσ } ∪
⋃
i=1,...,m(Sub (ti)σ ∪
Sub (Vars (ti)σ )) = {tσ } ∪
⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (ti)σ ∪ Sub
((⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti)
)
σ
)
= Sub (t)σ ∪
Sub (Vars (t)σ ). ✷
The inclusion relation between elems (·) , QSub (·) and Sub (·) is stated in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let t be a term. Then elems (t)⊆ QSub (t)⊆ Sub (t)
For normalized terms, the set of its subterms coincides with the set of its quasi-subterms:
Lemma 7. For any normalized term t, QSub (t)= Sub (t).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|.
Table 2
DY+ ACI deduction rules.
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q enc (t1, t2) , t3 → pt1q, if t2 ≡AC I t3
t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q aenc (t1, t2) ,priv (t3)→ pt1q, if t2 ≡AC I t3
t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q
t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q
t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq for all i
t1, t2 → papply (t1, t2)q
• |Sub (t)| = 1. Then t ∈X ∪A, and thus, QSub (t)= Sub (t)= {t};
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k > 1), QSub (t)= Sub (t);
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We need to show that QSub (t)= Sub (t).
· t = bin (t1, t2). Then QSub (bin (t1, t2))= {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2)= (as |Sub (ti)|< k) = {t} ∪
Sub (t1)∪ Sub (t2)= Sub (t);
· t = priv (t1). Then QSub (priv (t1))= {t} ∪ QSub (t1)= {t} ∪ Sub (t1)= Sub (t);
· t = · (L). As t is normalized, ∀p ∈ L, root (p) 6= ·. Then elems (L)≈ L. Thus, we have QSub (t)=
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p)= {t} ∪
⋃
p∈L QSub (p)= {t} ∪
⋃
p∈L Sub (p)= Sub (t). ✷
Lemma 8. For any term t, QSub (ptq)= pQSub (t)q.
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|.
• |Sub (t)| = 1. Then t ∈A ∪X . As QSub (t)= {t} and t = ptq, the statement holds;
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k > 1), the statement is true;
• Given t such that |Sub (t)| = k, k ≥ 1, let us consider all possible cases:
(1) t = bin (t1, t2). On the one hand, QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2). On the other hand,
ptq = bin (pt1q ,pt2q) and then, QSub (ptq) = {ptq} ∪ QSub (pt1q) ∪ QSub (pt2q). Then, as
QSub (ptiq)= pQSub (ti)q, we have that QSub (ptq)= pQSub (t)q;
(2) t = priv (t1). The proof is the same as for previous case;
(3) t = · (L). We have QSub (t)= {t}∪
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p); From Lemma 2 we have elems (p· (L)q)
= pelems (· (L))q, and then we obtain QSub (p· (L)q) = {p· (L)q} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(p·(L)q)
QSub (p) =
p{· (L)}q∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (ppq)= (by supposition)= p{· (L)}q∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) pQSub (p)q=
p{· (L)} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (p)q= pQSub (t)q. ✷
Lemma 9. For any term t, Sub (ptq)⊆ pSub (t)q.
Proof. From Lemma 7 we have Sub (ptq) = QSub (ptq). By Lemma 8 we obtain QSub (ptq) =
pQSub (t)q and by Lemma 6 we have QSub (t)⊆ Sub (t). Thus, Sub (ptq)⊆ pQSub (t)q⊆ pSub (t)q. ✷
3.2. Dolev–Yao deduction system modulo ACI
We define a Dolev–Yao deduction system modulo ACI (denoted DY+ ACI). It consists of composi-
tion rules and decomposition rules, depicted in Table 2 where t1, t2, . . . , tm ∈ T (i.e., we consider an 
infinite system having a finite representation given in the table). Note that rule enc (t1, t2) , t3 → pt1q, 
if t2 ≡AC I t3 is equivalent to enc (t1, t2) ,pt2q→ pt1q, since it is always possible to normalize term t3
(and obtain pt3q = pt2q) using, e.g. t3, t3 → ppair (t3, t3)q and since ppair (t3, t3)q = pair (pt3q ,pt3q)
we can decompose it by obtaining ppt3qq= pt3q.
We introduce two restrictions to define a subset of valid ground terms. The first one follows from 
the semantics of the functional symbol sig: its second argument must always be a private key. The 
second one is imposed in order to simplify our reasoning for solving constraint systems: we only 
consider atomic asymmetric private keys (this is not a real limitation for many applications).
Definition 3.8. A ground term t is valid iff for any subterm s ∈ Sub (t):
(1) s = sig (p,q) =⇒ pqq= priv
(
q′
)
for some q′;
(2) s = priv (p) =⇒ ppq ∈A
We suppose hereinafter that the considered constraint system S contains at least one atom, i.e. 
QSub (S) ∩ A 6= ∅. Otherwise we add a dummy constraint {a} ✄ a to S which will be satisfied by 
any substitution. We define priv (T ) = {priv (t) : t ∈ T } for a set of terms T . We define Vars (S) =⋃n
i=1 Vars (E i)∪ Vars (ti). We say that S is normalized, iff for all t ∈ Sub (S), t is normalized.
Example 5. We give a example of general constraint system and its solution within DY+ACI deduction 
system.
S =
{
enc (x,a) ,pair (c,a) ✄ b
· (x, c) ✄ a
}
,
where a, b, c ∈A and x ∈X . One of its solutions within DY+ ACI is σ = {x 7→ enc (pair (a,b) , c)}.
Definition 3.9. Let T = {t1, . . . , tk} be a non-empty set of terms. Then we define π(T ) as follows:
π(T )= p· (t1, . . . , tk)q .
We remark that π({t}) = ptq and π(T ) = pπ(T )q. Note also that π(t1, . . . , tk) can be interpreted 
as a set of terms. The terms derivable from π(t1, . . . , tk) are derivable from t1, . . . , tk and vice-versa.
Lemma 10. Let T be a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tk}. Then π(T ) ∈ Der (pTq) and pTq⊆ Der ({π(T )}).
From Lemma 3 we derive another property: π(T ) = π(pTq).
Lemma 11. π(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = π({π(T1), . . . ,π(Tm)})
Proof. From definition of π and Lemma 2, we have elems (π(T i))= pelems (T i)q. Next π({π(T1), . . . ,
π(Tm)}) = p· (L)q where
L ≈ pelems ({π(T1), . . . ,π(Tm)})q
= p
⋃
i=1,...,m
pelems (T i)qq
= p
⋃
i=1,...,m
elems (T i)q
On the other hand π(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = p·
(
L′
)
q, where L′ ≈ p
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (T i)q. ✷
3.3. Solving the derivability problem of DY+ ACI
The decidability of the derivability problem for DY has been extensively studied (see e.g. Amadio 
and Lugiez, 2000 for the atomic keys case, and Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2003 for the complex keys 
case) and is known to be polynomial. Also, we note that the derivability problem when the set of 
symbols only contains the dot · and constants is trivial, for in this case a constraint E ✄ t is satisfied 
if, and only if, the constants occurring in t also occur in E (proof left to the reader). Then the com-
bination algorithm of Chevalier and Rusinowitch (2005) yields directly the decidability of derivability 
for the DY + ACI case. Moreover since the derivability in DY and ACI sub-theories can be decided 
in polynomial time the algorithm deciding derivability returns in time polynomial in the number of 
subterms (Cortier and Delaune, 2012).
3.4. Existence of conservative solutions for satisfiable systems
In this subsection we show that for any satisfiable constraint system there exist particular models 
called conservative solutions. Roughly speaking, such a model can be defined by mapping each variable 
to a set of subterms and atoms extracted from the constraint system. This will bound the search space 
for finding a model (see § 3.5).
First, in Proposition 1 we state that a constraint system and its normal form have the same models 
and we show the equivalence between the existence of a model and the existence of a normalized 
model. As a consequence we will need only to consider normalized constraints and models in the 
sequel.
Proposition 1. The substitution σ is a model of the constraint system S if and only if σ is a model of pSq. 
Moreover, σ is a model of S if and only if pσq is a model of S .
Proof. By definition, σ is a model of S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n , iff ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} , ptiσq ∈ Der (pE iσq). But 
we know that ptiσq= pptiqσq and pE iσq= ppE iqσq. Thus, σ is a model of S if and only if σ is a 
model of pSq. But again, since ptiσq= pti pσqq and pE iσq= pE i pσqq, we have σ is a model of S if 
and only if pσq is a model of S . ✷
We introduce a transformation π(HS,σ (·)) on ground terms that replaces recursively every oc-
currence of any binary symbol bin by the ACI symbol · (and flattens nested ACI terms) when this 
occurrence roots a subterm that is not matched by any non-variable subterm of the constraint system 
with substitution σ .
Later, we will show that π(H (σ )) is also a model of S .
Definition 3.10. We denote a set of non-variable subterms of a constraint system S as ˚Sub (S), i.e. 
Sub (S) \X = ˚Sub (S).
Definition 3.11. Let S be a normalized constraint system which is satisfiable with the model σ . Let 
us fix some α ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S)). We define a function HS,σ (·) : Tg → 2
Tg as follows:
HS,σ (t)=


{α} , if t ∈ (A \ Sub (S));
{a} , if t = a ∈ (A∩ Sub (S));{
priv
(
π(HS,σ (t1))
)}
, if t = priv (t1) ;{
bin
(
π(HS,σ (t1)),π(H
S,σ (t2))
)}
, if t = bin (t1, t2)
and ptq ∈ p ˚Sub (S)σq ;
HS,σ (t1)∪ H
S,σ (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
and ptq /∈ p ˚Sub (S)σq ;⋃
p∈L H
S,σ (p) , if t = · (L) .
Henceforward, we will omit parameters and write H (·) instead of HS,σ (·) for shorter notation.
Definition 3.12. We define the superposition of π(·) and H (·) on a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tk} as 
follows: π(H (T )) = {π(H (t)) | t ∈ T }.
Definition 3.13. Let θ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} be a substitution. We define π(H (θ)) to be the substi-
tution {x1 7→ π(H (t1)), . . . , xk 7→ π(H (tk))}.
Note that since for every x ∈ dom (θ) we have x /∈ Vars (xθ), we also have dom (π(H (θ))) =
dom (θ). Moreover, by definition, π(H (θ)) is normalized.
Example 6. Let us consider a (normalized) constraint system S and its model σ from Example 5
and show that π(H (σ )) is also a model of S . π(H (enc (pair (a,b) , c))) = π(H (pair (a,b)) ∪ {c}) =
π({a} ∪ {b} ∪ {c}) = · (a,b, c) (we suppose that a ≺ b ≺ c). One can see that π(H (σ ))= {x 7→ · (a,b, c)}
is also a model of S within DY+ ACI.
We give several useful properties about the function H (·).
Lemma 12. For a ground term t, H (t)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (p).
Lemma 13. For a ground term t, H (t)= H (ptq).
Proof. By induction on |Sub (t)|:
• |Sub (t)| = 1 is possible in the only case: t = a ∈A and as a = paq, the equality is trivial;
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k > 1), H (t)= H (ptq) holds;
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We need to prove that H (t)= H (ptq).
· if t = priv (t1), then H (t)= {priv (π(H (t1)))} = (by induction hypothesis)= {priv (π(H (pt1q)))}
= H (priv (pt1q))= H (ptq);
· if t = bin (p,q) and ptq ∈ p ˚Sub (S)σq; Then H (ptq) = H (bin (ppq ,pqq)) = {bin(π(H (ppq)),
π(H (pqq)))} = (by induction) ={bin (π(pH (p)q),π(pH (q)q))} = (by Lemma 3) ={bin(π(H (p)),
π(H (q)))} = H (bin (p,q));
· if t = bin (p,q) and ptq /∈ p ˚Sub (S)σq; Then H (t)= H (p)∪ H (q)= (by induction hypothesis)=
H (ppq)∪ H (pqq)= (as pbin (ppq ,pqq)q= ptq /∈ p ˚Sub (S)σq) = H (bin (ppq ,pqq))= H (ptq);
· if t = · (L), where L = t1, . . . , tm . Note first that as t = · (L), ∀s ∈ elems (t), |Sub (s)| < |Sub (t)|. 
Then, by Lemma 12, H (t)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (p)= (by induction hypothesis)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (ppq). 
On the other part we have H (ptq)=
⋃
p∈elems(ptq)
H (p)= (by Lemma 2)=
⋃
p∈pelems(t)q
H (p)=⋃
p∈elems(t) H (ppq)= H (t). ✷
As a consequence, π(H (t)) = π(H (ptq)) = pπ(H (t))q= pπ(H (ptq))q.
We also note as another consequence that π(H (·)) transforms valid terms to valid ones.
Now, we show that for the subterms of a normalized constraint system instantiated with its nor-
malized model, the application of the transformation π(H (·)) on such terms is equivalent modulo 
ACI to the result obtained if the transformation was applied only on the model.
Proposition 2. Let S be a normalized constraint system and σ its normalized model. For all t ∈ Sub (S), 
ptπ(H (σ ))q= π(H (tσ )).
Proof. Note that t is normalized. We will prove it by induction on |Sub (t)|.
• Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then:
· either t ∈ A. In this case t ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S)), and as tµ = t for any substitution µ, then
π(H (tσ )) = π(H (t)) = π({t}) = t and tπ(H (σ ))= t . Thus, tπ(H (σ ))= π(H (tσ )).
· or t ∈ X . As σ is a model and t ∈ Sub (S), we have t ∈ dom (σ ), and, by definition, t ∈
dom (π(H (σ ))). Then, by definition of π(H (σ )), tπ(H (σ ))= π(H (tσ )).
• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then ptπ(H (σ ))q= pπ(H (tσ ))q.
• Show that for any t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p,q) or t = priv (q) or t =
· (t1, . . . , tm), but |Sub (p)| ≤ k, |Sub (q)| ≤ k and |Sub (ti)| ≤ k, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, statement
ptπ(H (σ ))q= pπ(H (tσ ))q is still true. We have:
· either t = bin (p,q). As t = bin (p,q) ∈ Sub (S)⇒ p ∈ Sub (S) and q ∈ Sub (S). As |Sub (p)| <
|Sub (t)| and from the induction assumption, we have ppπ(H (σ ))q= pπ(H (pσ ))q. The same
holds for q.
Again, as bin (p,q)σ ∈ ˚Sub (S)σ (as bin (p,q) /∈X and t ∈ Sub (S)) we have that
pπ(H (bin (p,q)σ ))q= pπ(H (bin (pσ ,qσ )))q= pπ(H (pbin (pσ ,qσ )q))q=
pπ(H (bin (ppσq ,pqσq)))q= pπ({bin (π(H (ppσq)),π(H (pqσq)))})q=
pπ({bin (pπ(H (pσ ))q ,pπ(H (qσ ))q)})q= pbin (pπ(H (pσ ))q ,pπ(H (qσ ))q)q=
pbin (ppπ(H (σ ))q ,pqπ(H (σ ))q)q = pbin (pπ(H (σ )),qπ(H (σ )))q = pbin (p,q)π(H (σ ))q =
ptπ(H (σ ))q.
· or t = · (t1, . . . , tm). We have for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti ∈ Sub (S), thus, by induction hypothesis
π(H (tiσ ))= pti π(H (σ ))q. π(H (tσ )) = π(H (· (t1σ , . . . , tmσ ))) = π(H (t1σ )∪ · · · ∪ H (tmσ )) =
(by Lemma 11) = π({π(H (t1σ )), . . . ,π(H (tmσ ))}) = π({pt1π(H (σ ))q , . . . ,ptm π(H (σ ))q}) =
p· (pt1π(H (σ ))q , . . . ,ptm π(H (σ ))q)q = p· (t1π(H (σ )), . . . , tm π(H (σ )))q = p(· (t1, . . . , tm))
π(H(σ ))q = ptπ(H (σ ))q
· or t = priv (q). Then q ∈ Sub (S).
π(H (tσ )) = π({priv (π(H (qσ )))}) = ppriv (π(H (qσ )))q= ppriv (qπ(H (σ )))q=
ppriv (q)π(H (σ ))q= ptπ(H (σ ))q.
Thus, the proposition is proven. ✷
Now we show that the derivability of a term from a set of terms is preserved by the transformation 
π(H (·)). But before we recall two simple properties of the derivability relation:
Lemma 14. Let A, B, C, D ⊆ Tg . Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and B ⊆ Der (C) then A ⊆ Der (C). Moreover, if 
A ⊆ Der (B) and C ⊆ Der (D) then A ∪ C ⊆ Der (B ∪ D).
Proposition 3. Let S be a normalized constraint system and σ its normalized model. For any DY+ ACI rule 
l1, . . . , lk → r, π(H (r)) ∈ Der ({π(H (l1)), . . . ,π(H (lk))}).
Proof idea. We proceed by considering all possible deduction rules. To give an idea, we show a proof 
for only one rule (see the full proof in Appendix B.4): aenc (t1, t2) ,ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. We have to 
show that term π(H (pt1q)) is derivable from the set of terms {π(H (aenc (t1, t2))),π(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. 
Consider two cases:
• ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q= puσq. Then
π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))), and then
π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der ({aenc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) ,ppriv (π(H (t2)))q}). On the other
hand, we have π(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = π(H (priv (t2))) = π({priv (π(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (π(H (t2)))q.
• ∄u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q= puσq. Then π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1)∪ H (t2)). Us-
ing Lemma 10, we have pH (t1)∪ H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q).
Therefore, by Lemma 14 and Lemma 13, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))). ✷
Using Propositions 2 and 3 we will show that transformation π(H (·)) preserves the property of a
substitution to be a model.
Proposition 4. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized model σ . Then substitution 
π(H (σ )) also satisfies S .
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n . Let us take any constraint (E ✄ t) ∈ S . 
As σ is a model of S , there exists a derivation D = A0, . . . , Ak such that A0 = pEσq and ptσq ∈ Ak .
By Proposition 3 and Lemma 14 we can easily prove that if k > 0, π(H
(
A j
)
) ⊆ Der
(
π(H
(
A j−1
)
)
)
, 
j = 1, . . . , k. Then, applying transitivity of Der (·) (Lemma 14) k times, we have that π(H (Ak)) ⊆
Der (π(H (A0))). In the case where k = 0, the statement π(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (π(H (A0))) is also true.
Using Proposition 2 we have that π(H (A0)) = π(H (Eσ )) = pE π(H (σ ))q, as E ⊆ Sub (S). The 
same for t: π(H (tσ )) = ptπ(H (σ ))q, and as ptσq ∈ Ak , we have ptπ(H (σ ))q ∈ π(H (Ak)). Therefore, 
we have that ptπ(H (σ ))q ∈ π(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (π(H (A0)))= Der (pE π(H (σ ))q), that means π(H (σ ))
satisfies any constraint of S . ✷
Till the end of subsection we will study a useful property of π(H (σ )). Proposition 5 and its corol-
lary show that if a constraint system has a normalized model σ which maps different variables to 
different values, then there exists another normalized model π(H (σ )) that maps any variable of its 
domain to an ACI-set of some non-variable subterms of the constraint system instantiated by itself 
and some private keys built with atoms of the constraint system. This kind of model will be called 
conservative.
Lemma 15. Given a normalized substitution σ and normalized term u. If puσq= bin (p,q) and u /∈ X and 
xσ 6= yσ for all x 6= y then there exists s ∈ Sub (u) such that s = bin
(
p′,q′
)
and psσq= bin (p,q). The same 
is true in the case of puσq= priv (p).
Proof. As u = puq and puσq= bin (p,q), we have:
• u not in form of · (L). Then, as u /∈ X and puσq = bin (p,q), we have u = bin
(
p′,q′
)
(where 
pp′σq= p and pq′σq= q). Then we can choose s = bin
(
p′,q′
)
= u ∈ Sub (u).
• u = · (t1, . . . , tm), ∀i root (ti) 6= · and m > 1 since u = puq. Then for all i, ti is either a variable,
or bin
(
p′i,q
′
i
)
. But as xσ 6= yσ for all x 6= y and as σ is normalized, we can claim that the set 
{t1, . . . , tm} contains at most one variable (∃ j : t j ∈X =⇒ ∀k 6= j, tk /∈X ). Since puσq= bin (p,q)
we have ∀i, j ptiσq = pt jσq, and then, as m > 1, there exists i such that ti = bin
(
p′i,q
′
i
)
. Then, 
by definition of normalization function and from puσq= bin (p,q) we have that pelems (uσ )q=
{bin (p,q)}. Thus, pbin
(
p′i,q
′
i
)
σq = bin (p,q), i.e. we can choose s = ti , as ti ∈ Sub (u) and ti =
bin
(
p′i,q
′
i
)
.
The other case (priv) can be proved similarly. ✷
Definition 3.14. A substitution σ is a conservative model of a constraint system S , iff
(1) σ is normalized;
(2) σ is a model of S;
(3) For any x ∈ dom (σ ) there exist k ∈N and s1, . . . , sk ∈ ˚Sub (S)∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A) such that xσ =
π({s1σ , . . . , skσ }) and si 6= s j , if i 6= j and root (si) 6= · for all i.
Proposition 5. Assume we are given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized model σ such that 
∀x, y ∈ dom (σ ) , x 6= y =⇒ xσ 6= yσ . Then π(H (σ )) is a conservative model of S .
Proof. From Proposition 4 we obtain that π(H (σ )) is a normalized solution of S . By definition, 
x π(H (σ ))= π(H (xσ )). Let us take any s ∈ H (xσ ) (note that s is a ground term). Then, by definition 
of H (·) we have:
• either s ∈ A. Then, by definition of H (·), s ∈ (A ∩ Sub (S)). Thus, s π(H (σ )) = s, s ∈ ˚Sub (S),
s 6= · (L);
• or s = bin (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) and ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that puσq= pbin (t1, t2)q= bin (pt1q ,pt2q).
As all conditions of Lemma 15 are satisfied, ∃v ∈ Sub (u) such that pvσq = bin (pt1q ,pt2q) and
v = bin (p,q) and as u ∈ ˚Sub (S) then v ∈ ˚Sub (S). By Proposition 2, pv π(H (σ ))q= π(H (vσ )) =
π(H (pvσq)) = π(H (bin (t1, t2))) = π({bin (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2)))}) = bin (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) =
s. That means, ∃v ∈ ˚Sub (S) , v 6= · (L) such that s = pv π(H (σ ))q.
• or s = priv (π(H (t1))). In this case, as s is ground, π(H (t1)) must be an atom (we recall that
π(H (·)) transforms valid terms to valid ones), moreover, by definition of H (·), this atom is from
(A ∩ Sub (S)). Therefore, s = priv (a), where a ∈A ∩ Sub (S) (and of course, s 6= · (L)).
Thus, for all s ∈ H (xσ ), there exists v ∈ Sub (S)∪priv (Sub (S)∩A)\X such that s = pv π(H (σ ))q. 
Therefore, as x π(H (σ ))= π(H (xσ )), we have that x π(H (σ ))= π({ps1π(H (σ ))q , . . . ,psk π(H (σ ))q})
= π({s1π(H (σ )), . . . , sk π(H (σ ))}), where s1, . . . , sk ∈ ˚Sub (S)∪priv (Sub (S)∩A) and si 6= · (L) , ∀1 ≤
i ≤ k. That proves the proposition. ✷
Corollary 6. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized model σ ′ such that x 6= y =⇒
xσ ′ 6= yσ ′ . Then S admits a conservative solution.
3.5. Bounds on conservative solutions
To get a decidability result, we first show an upper bound on the size of a conservative model. 
Then we reduce any satisfiable constraint system to another satisfiable one that admits a conservative 
model (this reduction is, in fact, using one name for the variables on which some preliminary fixed 
model returns equal values). Moreover the considered conservative model of the obtained constraint 
system can be easily extended to a conservative model (of the same size) of the initial constraint 
system. We also show that the reduced constraint system has not a larger size than the original one. 
This means that the original constraint system has a model which is bounded with regard to the 
size of the constraint system. Thus, we prove the existence of a model with bounded size for any 
satisfiable constraint system.
Lemma 16. For any term t and substitution σ , ∀s ∈ Sub (t) |Sub (ptσq)| ≥ |Sub (psσq)|.
Proof. From Lemma 5 we can easily obtain Sub (sσ ) ⊆ Sub (tσ ). Then we need to prove that 
|Sub (ppq)| ≤ |Sub (pqq)|, if Sub (p)⊆ Sub (q). The proof is mainly based on the fact that if Sub (p)⊆
Sub (q) then Sub (ppq) \ {ppq} ⊆ Sub (pqq). Let us consider several cases.
• If p = q then the statement is trivial.
• If there exists v ∈ Sub (q) such that v = bin
(
p, p′
)
or v = bin
(
p′, p
)
or v = priv (p). Then note 
that by definition of the normalization, since root (v) 6= ·, we have pvq ∈ Sub (pqq). Then (without 
loss of generality we consider only case v = bin
(
p, p′
)
) pvq = bin
(
ppq ,pp′q
)
and thus ppq ∈
Sub (pvq). Therefore, (since pvq ∈ Sub (pqq)) ppq ∈ Sub (pqq) and then Sub (ppq) ⊆ Sub (pqq). 
From this follows |Sub (ppq)| ≤ |Sub (pqq)|.
• Otherwise, there exists v ∈ QSub (q) such that v = · (L) and elems (p) ⊆ elems (v) (note that
v 6= p, otherwise we are in the one of the two cases above). From Lemma 2 we have
elems (ppq) ⊆ elems (pvq). Note that by definition of the normalization and since v ∈ QSub (q)
(and thus v = q or there exists v ′ ∈ Sub (q) such that v ′ = bin
(
v, p′
)
or v ′ = bin
(
p′, v
)
or v ′ =
priv (v)) we have that pvq ∈ Sub (pqq), moreover, Sub (pvq)⊆ Sub (pqq). Then from Lemma 6 we
have elems (pvq) ⊆ Sub (pqq). Thus, elems (ppq) ⊆ Sub (pqq), consequently, Sub (elems (ppq)) ⊆
Sub (pqq). Now, if elems (ppq) = {ppq}, then the statement becomes trivial. Otherwise, ppq =
· (elems (ppq)), and then Sub (ppq)= ppq ∪ Sub (elems (ppq)). Since we have already shown that
Sub (elems (ppq)) ⊆ Sub (pqq), to prove the statement it is enough to show that there exists
p′ ∈ Sub (pqq) such that p′ /∈ Sub (elems (ppq)). For such value we can choose p′ = pvq (pvq
cannot be in Sub (elems (ppq)), since elems (ppq) ⊆ elems (pvq) ⊆ Sub (pvq) and in the current
case root (pvq)= ·). ✷
Lemma 17. Given a normalized constraint system S and its conservative model σ . Then ∀x ∈ Vars (S) ,
Sub (xσ )⊆ pSub (S)σq∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A).
Proof. Given a ground substitution σ , let us define a strict total order on variables: x ❁ y ⇐⇒
(|Sub (xσ )|< |Sub (yσ )|) ∨ (|Sub (xσ )| = |Sub (yσ )| ∧ x ≺ y).
By Proposition 5 for any x ∈ Vars (S) we have xσ = π(
{
sx1σ , . . . , s
x
kx
σ
}
), where sxi ∈ (Sub (S) \X ) ∪
priv (Sub (S)∩A) and sxi 6= · (L). Moreover, s
x
i are normalized (as S is normalized).
Let us show that if y ∈ Vars
(
sxi
)
for some i, then y ❁ x. Suppose that y ∈ Vars
(
sxi
)
and 
x ❁ y. Then |Sub (xσ )| =
∣∣Sub (({sx1σ , . . . , sxkxσ }))∣∣ = ∣∣Sub (p· (sx1σ , . . . , sxkxσ )q)∣∣ ≥ (by Lemma 16) ≥∣∣Sub (psxi σq)∣∣> |Sub (pyσq)|, because we know that sxi = bin (p,q) or sxi = priv (p) and y ∈ Vars (sxi )
(for example, in the first case, 
∣∣Sub (psxi σq)∣∣ = |Sub (bin (ppσq ,pqσq))| = 1 + |Sub ({ppσq ,pqσq})|
and as y ∈ Vars ({p,q}), using Lemma 16, we get 
∣∣Sub (psxi σq)∣∣≥ 1 +|Sub (pyσq)|). Since |Sub (pyσq)|
= |Sub (yσ )| we have y ❁ x. Contradiction.
Now we show by induction the main property of this lemma.
• let x =min❁(Vars (S)). Then xσ = π(
{
sx1σ , . . . , s
x
kx
σ
}
) = p·
(
sx1σ , . . . , s
x
kx
σ
)
q and all s
x
i are ground
(as ∄y ❁ x). Then xσ = p·
(
sx1, . . . , s
x
kx
)
q. Since s
x
i are normalized with non-· root, we have that
Sub (xσ )=
{
p·
(
sx1, . . . , s
x
kx
)
q
}
∪ Sub
(
sx1
)
∪ · · · ∪ Sub
(
sx
kx
)
⊆ pSub (S)σq∪priv (A∩ Sub (S)), as ∀s ∈
Sub
(
sxi
)
, s ∈ Tg and s ∈ Sub (S) or s = priv (a) or s = a, where a ∈ Sub (S)∩A, therefore s = psq=
sσ ∈ pSub (S)σq∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A) and p·
(
sx1, . . . , s
x
kx
)
q= xσ ∈ pSub (S)σq.
• Suppose, for all z❁ y, Sub (zσ )⊆ pSub (Sσ )q∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A).
• Show that Sub (yσ )⊆ Sub (Sσ )∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A).
We know that yσ = π(
{
s
y
1σ , . . . , s
y
ky
σ
}
) = p·
(
s
y
1σ , . . . , s
y
ky
σ
)
q and ∀z ∈ Vars
(
s
y
i
)
, z ❁ y. Then 
we have Sub (yσ ) = {yσ } ∪ Sub
(
ps
y
1σq
)
∪ · · · ∪ Sub
(
ps
y
ky
σq
)
. We know that yσ ∈ pSub (S)σq. 
Let us show that Sub
(
ps
y
i σq
)
⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A). By Theorems 5 and 9 we have
Sub
(
ps
y
i σq
)
⊆ pSub
(
s
y
i σ
)
q = pSub
(
s
y
i
)
σ ∪ Sub
(
Vars
(
s
y
i
)
σ
)
q = pSub
(
s
y
i
)
σq ∪ Sub
(
Vars
(
s
y
i
)
σ
)
. 
As s
y
i ∈ Sub (S) ∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A), we can see that pSub
(
s
y
i
)
σq ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪
priv (Sub (S)∩A); then from the induction hypothesis and the statement proved above we have 
Sub
(
Vars
(
s
y
i
)
σ
)
⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪ priv (Sub (S)∩A). Thus, Sub (yσ ) ⊆ pSub (S)σq ∪
priv (Sub (S)∩A). ✷
Proposition 7. For a normalized constraint system S that has a conservative model σ , ∀x ∈ Vars (S) ,
|Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)|.
Proof. As |pSub (S)σq| ≤ |Sub (S)σ | ≤ |Sub (S)|, we have that |Sub (xσ )| ≤ |pSub (S)σq ∪
priv (A∩ Sub (S))| ≤ |pSub (S)σq| + |priv (A∩ Sub (S))| ≤ (as |pTq| ≤ |T | and |Tσ | ≤ |T |) ≤
|Sub (S)| + |A ∩ Sub (S)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)|; thus, |Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)|. ✷
From this proposition and Corollary 6 we obtain the existence of a bounded model for any nor-
malized constraint system that has a model mapping different variables to different values. We will 
reduce an arbitrary constraint system to the already studied case. The target properties are stated in 
Proposition 8 and Corollary 9.
Lemma 18. Given any constraint system S and any substitution θ such that dom (θ) = Vars (S) and 
img (θ)⊆ dom (θ), then |Sub (Sθ)| ≤ |Sub (S)|.
Proof. By Lemma 5, |Sub (Sθ)| = |Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ)|, but Vars (S) θ ⊆ dom (θ) = Vars (S)
(Vars (S) θ consists only of variables), and then Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Vars (S) θ . As Vars (S) ⊆ Sub (S), 
we have Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ)= Sub (S) θ . Thus, |Sub (Sθ)| = |Sub (S) θ | ≤ |Sub (S)|. ✷
Definition 3.15. Let σ and δ be two substitutions. Then σ [δ] is a substitution such that dom (σ [δ])=
dom (δ) and for all x ∈ dom (σ [δ]), xσ [δ] = (xδ)σ .
Lemma 19. Let θ and σ be two substitutions such that img (θ)= dom (σ ), dom (σ )⊆ dom (θ). Then, for any 
term t, (tθ)σ = tσ [θ].
Proof. When we apply θ to t , every variable x of t such that x ∈ dom (θ) is replaced by xθ ; then 
we apply σ to tθ : every variable y of tθ is replaced by yσ , thus, every variable x from dom (θ) will 
be replaced by (xθ)σ (as img (θ)= dom (σ )); and no other variables will be replaced (as dom (σ )⊆
dom (θ)). This corresponds with the definition of σ [θ]. ✷
Proposition 8. Given a satisfiable constraint system S there exists a model σ of S such that ∀x ∈
dom (σ ) , |Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (pSq)|
Proof. Given a normalized model σ ′ of S we build a substitution θ that maps different variables 
whose σ ′-values are equal to a single new variable. In this way we obtain a new constraint sys-
tem pSθq and its normalized model. Then we apply Corollary 6 and get a conservative model σ ′′
of pSθq. By applying Proposition 7 we get a bound on the size for this model. On the other hand 
, we use Lemma 19 to show that σ ′′[θ] is a model of pSq. Then, using the obtained bound and 
Lemma 18, we show the existence of a model with the desired property. The detailed proof is given 
in Appendix B.6 ✷
Corollary 9. A constraint system S is satisfiable iff there exists a normalized model of S defined on Vars (S)
which maps a variable to a ground term in T (A ∩ QSub (pSq) , ∅) of size ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)|.
Using this result we get Algorithm 1 for solving constraint systems:
Algorithm 1: Solving constraint systems.
Input: A constraint system S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n
Output: A model σ , if it exists else ⊥
1 Guess for every variable x of S a value for xσ of size ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)|;
2 if σ satisfies E i ✄ ti for all i = 1, . . . , n then return σ else return ⊥
Proposition 10. Algorithm 1 is correct.
Proof. Let σ be an output of Algorithm 1. Then σ is a ground substitution and σ satisfies all con-
straints from S ′ and therefore, satisfies all constraints from S . This means, σ is a model of S . ✷
Proposition 11. Algorithm 1 is complete.
Proof. Suppose S is satisfiable. Then, by Corollary 9, there exists a guess of values for every element 
of Vars (S) with size ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)| which defines a model σ of S . Thus Algorithm 1 will return 
this σ . ✷
4. Complexity analysis
In this section we study the complexity of the proposed algorithm. First, we expose a representa-
tion of constraint systems to justify the selected measure for algorithm inputs. Then, we remark that 
the normalization algorithm is polynomial and we show that the derivability algorithm is polynomial 
too. As a consequence the algorithm for solving general constraint systems within the DY+ACI model 
is in NP. Since constraint solving is known to be NP-hard for well-formed constraints, we deduce it is 
NP-complete for general constraints.
To determine the algorithm complexity we first define a reasonable measure for inputs. Remark 
that |Sub (·)| does not approximate polynomially the number of bits needed to write its argument 
(a term, a set of terms, or a constraint system). As a measure for terms and sets of terms we will use 
|Sub (·)| + |E (·)|, where E (·) is a set of edges in the DAG-representation of its argument. For the size 
of a system of constraints S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n we will use n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)|. The justification is 
given below.
Fig. 4. DAG-representation of constraint system S .
Definition 4.1. The DAG-representation of a constraint system S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n is a tagged graph 
with labeled edges G= 〈V,E, tag〉 (V is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges; tag is a tagging 
function defined on V) such that:
• there exists a bijection f :V 7→ Sub (S);
• ∀v ∈V tag (v)= 〈s,m〉, where
· s = root ( f (v));
· m is a 2n-bit integer, where m[2i − 1] = 1 if and only if f (v) ∈ E i and m[2i] = 1 if and only if
f (v) = ti .
• v1
1
−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if ∃p ∈ T : (∃ bin : f (v1) = bin ( f (v2), p)) ∨ f (v1) = priv ( f (v2));
• v1
2
−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if ∃p ∈ T : ∃ bin : f (v1) = bin (p, f (v2));
• v1
i
−→ v2 ∈ E if and only if f (v1) = · (L)∧ L[i] = f (v2);
Example 7. A constraint system
S =


{enc (a, x) ,pair (b,enc (a,a)) , c} ✄a
{priv (b) , c} ✄y
{enc (sig (a,priv (c)) , y) ,aenc (x,b)} ✄pair (enc (a, x) , c)
will be represented as shown2 in Fig. 4. The nodes of this graph represent the elements from Sub (S)
by indicating their root symbols (first part of their tags) and pointers to their children.
The given representation takes less than P (n × |V(S)| + |E (S)|) bits, where n is the number of 
constraints, V(·) is the set of nodes and E(·) is the set of edges in the DAG-representation, and P is 
some polynomial with non-negative coefficients. As we have a bijection between V(S) and Sub (S), 
we obtain |V(S)| = |Sub (S)|. Therefore we will estimate the complexity of our algorithm by taking 
n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)| as the measure of the constraint system S .
The DAG-representation of a term t has a structure similar to the one of a constraint system 
except that the second part of the tagging function is dropped: we need only root ( f (v)) as a node’s 
tag. The size of this representation will be polynomially bounded by |Sub (t)| + |E (t)|. Thus we give 
the following definition:
2 Label “1” (resp. “2”) of an edge is represented by a left (resp. right) side of its source node.
Definition 4.2. The measure of a term t is: measure (t)= |Sub (t)|+ |E (t)|. The measure of a constraint 
system S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n is: measure (S)= n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)|.
We remark that the given measure is not the exact number of bits needed to write the argument 
down (this value involves a logarithm factor and would complexify the notation), but is a polynomial 
approximation of it which is sufficient for our purpose.
Note that for normalized terms and constraint systems the number of edges in their DAG-repres-
entation are polynomially bounded w.r.t. the number of vertices:
Lemma 20. For any normalized term t, |E (t)| < (|Sub (t)|)2 . For any normalized constraint system S , 
|E (S)| < (|Sub (S)|)2 .
Proof. Since the term (resp. constraint system) is normalized, there are at most two edges between 
two nodes. A binary node has at most two outgoing edges per destination node, an unary node — one, 
and ·-node has at most one outgoing edge per destination node because of normalization. Therefore, 
as the graph is directed and acyclic, with at most two edges between two nodes, we have less than 
|Sub (x)| × (|Sub (x)| − 1) edges (where x is a term t or a constraint system S). ✷
4.1. Satisfiability of a general DY+ ACI constraint system is in NP
Lemma 21. The normalization of a term t can be done in polynomial time on measure (t). The same holds for 
a constraint system S : normalization can be done in polynomial time on measure (S).
Proof idea (for the case of terms). The algorithm of term normalization works bottom-up by flatten-
ing nested ACI-sets, sorting children of ACI-set nodes, merging duplicated nodes while removing 
unnecessary duplicating edges and removing nodes without incoming edges (except the root-node 
of t). ✷
Lemma 22. For a term t, |Sub (ptq)| ≤ |Sub (t)|; for a set of terms T , |Sub (pTq)| ≤ |Sub (T )|; for a constraint 
system S , |Sub (pSq)| ≤ |Sub (S)|.
The proof for the case of terms is given in Appendix B.5 ✷
Proposition 12. Satisfiability of general DY+ ACI constraint systems is in NP.
Proof. Algorithm 1 returns a solution if it exists. We have to show that the verification of this so-
lution is polynomial with regard to the input. To do this, we will normalize Sσ and then apply the 
result described in § 3.3 for checking derivability. Using the fact that |Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)| and 
normalization is polynomial, checking the validity of terms in pSσq and the derivability, we can get 
an upper bound of the execution time that is polynomial on measure (S). The details of the proof are 
given in Appendix B.3. ✷
On the other hand, we can reuse a technique presented in Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) to 
show that the satisfiability of a constraint system is an NP-hard problem. The authors encode the 
3-SAT problem into an insecurity problem of a single-session sequential protocol. Because the steps
of the protocol are linearly ordered, finding an attack is reduced to the satisfiability problem of a
single well-formed constraint system. Since the class of constraint systems we consider contains the
case presented in this work, we can conclude to the NP-hardness of our problem. Thus,
Theorem 1. Satisfiability of general DY+ ACI constraint systems is NP-complete.
Fig. 5. Proof plan.
5. Satisfiability of general DY constraint systems
The constraint solving algorithm for the DY+ ACI theory can be adapted to the classical DY case.
But we cannot apply it directly, as a derived solution may contain an ACI symbol. Thus, we need to do 
some more work to prove the decidability of the DY case. The scheme we follow to solve a constraint 
system within the DY deduction system is shown in Fig. 5.
First, we show that if a constraint system is satisfiable within DY, then it is satisfiable within 
DY + ACI (Proposition 13). Second, as we know, we can find a model of a given constraint system 
within DY+ACI. Third, we transform the model obtained from previous step (which is in DY+ACI) in 
such a way, that the resulting substitution will be a model of the initial constraint system within DY 
(Theorem 2). The transformation δ to be used is simple: we replace any ACI list of terms · (t1, . . . , tn)
by nested pairs: pair (t1,pair (..., tn)). Note that this transformation has a linear complexity and the 
transformed model will have a DAG-size not more than twice bigger than the initial one. This keeps 
the complexity in NP, for the problem of satisfiability of general constraint system within the DY 
model.
Definition 5.1. We define a replacement δ (t) : Tg 7→ Tg in the following way:
δ (t)=


t, if t ∈X ∪A;
bin (δ (p) , δ (q)) , if t = bin (p,q) ,
priv (δ (p)) , if t = priv (p) ;
δ (t1) , if t = · (t1) ;
pair (δ (t1) , δ (· (t2, . . . , tm))) , if t = · (t1, . . . , tm) ,m> 1;
Definition 5.2. Given a substitution σ . Then δ (σ ) = {x→ δ (xσ )}x∈dom(σ ) . For T ⊆ Tg , δ (T ) =
{δ (t) : t ∈ T }.
To recall the Dolev–Yao deduction system (DY), see Table 1.
Definition 5.3. A constraint system S is standard if for all s ∈ Sub (S) root (s) 6= ·. The definition is 
extended in natural way to terms, sets of terms and substitutions.
We can redefine the notion of derivation for Dolev–Yao deduction system in a natural way, and 
denote it as DerDY .
Lemma 23. Any standard constraint system is normalized.
Lemma 24. Let t be a standard term and σ be a normalized substitution. Then tσ is normalized.
Proposition 13. If a standard constraint system S has a model σ within the DY deduction system, then S has 
a model within the DY+ ACI deduction system.
Proof. It is enough to consider the same model σ in DY+ ACI. As Sσ is normalized and as DY+ ACI
includes all the rules from DY, it is easy to show using the same derivation that proves σ to be a 
model in DY, that σ remains a model of S in DY+ ACI. ✷
Next we show that we can build a model of a constraint system within DY from a model of this 
constraint system within DY+ ACI.
Proposition 14. For any DY + ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, if li are normalized for all i = 1, . . . , k then δ (r) ∈
DerDY ({δ (l1) , . . . , δ (lk)}).
Proof. Let us consider all possible rules:
(1) t1, t2 → pbin (t1, t2)q for bin 6= sig.
As t1 and t2 are normalized, then pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (t1, t2). We can see, that δ (bin (t1, t2)) =
bin (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) ∈ DerDY ({δ (t1) , δ (t2)}).
(2) t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
As t1 and priv (t2) are normalized, then psig (t1,priv (t2))q = sig (t1,priv (t2)). We can see
that δ (sig (t1,priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) , δ (priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) ,priv (δ (t2))) ∈ DerDY ({δ (t1) ,
priv (δ (t2))}), but priv (δ (t2))= δ (priv (t2)).
(3) t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
The fact that elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ti) follows from ti = ptiq (for all i) and
Lemma 4.
We can (DY)-derive from {δ (ti)} any term in δ (elems (ti)) trivially if ti 6= · (L) and by applying
rules pair (s1, s2)
DY
−−→ s1 and pair (s1, s2)
DY
−−→ s2 otherwise (by induction on the size of ti ).
One can observe, that δ (t) is a pairing (composition of pair (·, ·) operator with itself) of
δ (elems (t)) (by definition of δ (·) and normalization function). And then, as δ (t) is limited in
size, we can (DY)-derive δ (t) from δ (elems (t)) by iterative use of rule s1, s2
DY
−−→ pair (s1, s2), if 
needed.
Thus, first we can derive δ (elems (ti)) for all i, and then rebuild (derive with composition rules) 
δ (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q).
(4) enc (t1, t2) ,pt2q→ pt1q.
Since enc (t1, t2) is normalized, we have t1 = pt1q and t2 = pt2q. Thus, δ (t1) ∈ DerDY ({enc(δ (t1) ,
δ (t2)), δ (t2)}) and this is what we need, as δ (enc (t1, t2))= enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)).
(5) pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Similar case.
(6) pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Similar case.
(7) aenc (t1, t2) ,ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. Similar case. Note, that δ (priv (t2))= priv (δ (t2))
(8) · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq.
As said above, δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))) ⊆ DerDY ({δ (· (t1, . . . , tm))}); and as δ (elems (ti)) ⊆
δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))), we can (DY)-derive (by composition rules) δ (ti) from δ (elems (ti)). ✷
Proposition 15. Given a standard constraint system S and a normalized model σ of S in DY+ ACI then, for 
any t ∈ Sub (S) we have δ (tσ )= tδ (σ ).
Proof. The proof is by induction as in Proposition 2.
• Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then either t ∈A or t ∈X . Both are trivial cases.
• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then δ (tσ )= tδ (σ ).
• Show, that for t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p,q) or t = priv (p) and |Sub (p)| ≤ k
and |Sub (q)| ≤ k, statement δ (tσ )= tδ (σ ) is still true. We have:
· either t = bin (p,q). As δ (bin (p,q)σ ) = δ (bin (pσ ,qσ )) = bin (δ (pσ ) , δ (qσ )) = bin(pδ (σ ) ,
qδ (σ )) = bin (p,q) δ (σ ).
· or t = priv (p). In this case the proof can be done by analogy with previous one.
Remark: as S is standard, t 6= · (L). ✷
Theorem 2. Let S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n be a standard constraint system and σ be a normalized model in 
DY+ ACI. Then δ (σ ) is a model in DY of S .
Proof. Let E✄ t be any element of S . As σ is a model of S , then ptσq ∈ Der (pEσq). As σ is normal-
ized and S is standard, using Lemma 24 we have ptσq = tσ and pEσq = Eσ . Then, tσ ∈ Der (Eσ ). 
That means there exists a DY+ ACI derivation D = {A0, . . . , Ak} such that A0 = Eσ and tσ ∈ Ak .
By Proposition 14 and Lemma 14 (which also works for DY case) we can easily prove that if 
k > 0, δ
(
A j
)
⊆ DerDY
(
δ
(
A j−1
))
, j = 1, . . . , k. Note, that δ (A) is a set of standard terms (and thus, 
normalized) for any set of terms A. Then, applying the transitivity property of DerDY (·) (Lemma 14
for DY) k times, we have that δ (Ak)⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)). In the case where k = 0, the statement δ (Ak)⊆
DerDY (δ (A0)) is also true.
Using Proposition 15 we have that δ (A0) = δ (Eσ ) = Eδ (σ ), as E ⊆ QSub (S). The same for t: 
δ (tσ )= tδ (σ ), and as tσ ∈ Ak , we have tδ (σ ) ∈ δ (Ak).
Thus, we have that tδ (σ ) ∈ δ (Ak)⊆ DerDY (δ (A0))= DerDY (Eδ (σ )), that means δ (σ ) DY-satisfies 
any constraint of S . ✷
We present an example illustrating the theorem.
Example 8. Let us consider a standard constraint system similar to Example 5.
S =
{
enc (x,a) ,pair (c,a) ✄ b
pair (x, c) ✄ a
}
,
Using Algorithm 1, we can get a model of S within DY+ ACI, as in Example 6, σ = {x 7→ · (a,b, c)}. 
Then, by applying the transformation δ (·), we will get σ ′ = δ (σ )= {x 7→ pair (a,pair (b, c))}. We can 
see that σ ′ is also a model of S within DY (as it was proven in Theorem 2).
Corollary 16 (of Theorem 2 and Proposition 13). A standard constraint system S is satisfiable within DY iff it 
is satisfiable within DY+ ACI.
Theorem 3. Satisfiability of DY constraint systems is in NP.
Proof. It is a consequence of Proposition 12 and Corollary 16. ✷
Then, since the problem is known to be NP-hard (Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2003) for the particular 
case of well-formed constraints, we obtain the NP-hardness and thus, NP-completeness:
Corollary 17. Satisfiability of DY constraint systems is NP-complete.
6. Conclusions
In this work we have presented a decision algorithm for the satisfiability of general constraint
systems within Dolev–Yao deduction system possibly extended with an ACI symbol that can be used 
to represent sets of terms. The complexity of the algorithm was proved to be in NP.
We have also given two applications of the presented result: protocol insecurity with non-
communicating intruders and discovering XML-based attacks. Moreover, recent works (Mödersheim 
et al., 2013; Kassem et al., 2013) have shown the interest of general intruder constraints for analyzing 
security problems of mobile code encountered in web-browsers, smartphones, and virtualized infras-
tructures. In this approach, an attacker can construct new processes from his knowledge by using the 
constructors of the ambient calculus, in the same way as a Dolev Yao intruder constructs messages in 
protocol verification.
As future works one may consider the verification of equivalence properties such as anonymity or 
secrecy of a ballot in vote. For instance one has to show that there is no action for an attacker that 
makes distinguishable two protocol executions with different identities or vote values. In presence 
of multiple intruders this may require to extend a decision procedure for trace equivalences (Baudet, 
2005) using our techniques. Another challenging extension of our result would be a decision pro-
cedure for general constraints with negation. Negation constraints are particularly useful to model 
non-disclosure policies when generating distributed orchestration of secure services, following the 
approach introduced in Avanesov et al. (2012).
Appendix A. General constraints for subterm theories
We demonstrate here that the well-formedness property is a strong restriction for constraint sys-
tems: in some theories satisfiability of well-formed constraints may be decidable, while satisfiability 
of general constraints may be undecidable.
We define a subterm deduction system to be a finite set of rules of the following forms:
(1) composition rules: for all public functional symbols f , x1, . . . , xk → f (x1, . . . , xk)
(2) decomposition rules: t1, . . . , tm → s, where s is a subterm of ti for some i.
We show that the satisfiability of a constraint system within a subterm deduction system is unde-
cidable in general. More precisely:
Instance: a subterm deduction system D , a constraint system C .
Question: is C satisfiable?
To show this, we reduce the halting problem of a Deterministic Turing Machine (TM) M that works 
on a single tape. We consider the tape alphabet Ŵ = {0, 1, ♭}, and ♭ is the blank symbol. The states 
of the TM M are in a finite set Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. W.l.o.g. we can assume that q1 (resp. qn) is the 
unique initial (resp. accepting) state.
In order to represent Turing machine configurations as terms we shall introduce a set of variables 
X and an alphabet F
F := {0,1, ♭,⊥} ∪ Q ,
where F \ {⊥} are public functional symbols.
The TM configuration with tape ⊥ abcde ⊥, (where ⊥ is an endmarker), with symbol d under the 
head, and state q will be represented by the following term of q(c(b(a(⊥), d(e(⊥), x) where x ∈ X
and a, b, c, d, e ∈ {0, 1, ♭}.
The composition rules we consider for the TM are u → f (u) for each f ∈ {0,1, ♭} and u, v, w →
q(u, v, w) for each q ∈ Q . For each TM transition of M we will introduce some decomposition de-
duction rule that can be applied on a term representation q(u, v, q′(u′, v ′, x′)) iff the transition can 
be applied to a configuration represented by q(u, v, _) and generate a configuration represented by 
q′(u′, v ′, _).
For each TM instruction of type: ‘In state q reading a go to state q′ and write b”, we define the follow-
ing rule for a, b ∈ {0, 1, ♭}:
q(u,a(v),q′(u,b(v), x))→ q′(u,b(v), x).
For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move right”, we define the following 
rules for a ∈ {0, 1, ♭}:
q(u,a(v),q′(a(u), v, x))→ q′(a(u), v, x).
A rule is for extending the tape on the right when needed:
q(u,⊥,q′(u, ♭(⊥), x))→ q′(u, ♭(⊥), x).
For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move left”, we define the following 
rules for a ∈ {0,1, ♭} for each b ∈ {0,1, ♭}:
q(b(u),a(v),q′(u,b(a(v)), x))→ q′(u,b(a(v)), x).
A rule is for extending the tape on the left when needed:
q(⊥, v,q′(⊥, ♭(v), x))→ q′(⊥, ♭(v), x).
The resulting deduction system DM is obviously a subterm deduction system.
Let us consider a constraint S to be solved modulo DM :
{q1(⊥,⊥, x)}✄ qn(⊥,⊥, y).
This constraint is satisfiable iff there is a sequence of transitions of M from a configuration with 
initial state q1 and empty tape to a configuration with an accepting state and empty tape. Hence the 
constraint solving problem is undecidable.
Let us recall the definition of some properties of constraint systems. These two properties are 
natural for modeling standard security protocols:
Variable origination: ∀i, ∀x ∈ Vars (E i) ∃ j < i x ∈ Vars
(
t j
)
,
Monotonicity: j < i =⇒ E j ⊆ E i .
Note that {{q1(⊥,⊥, x)}✄ qn(⊥,⊥, y)} is obviously monotonic.
As a consequence, satisfiability of monotonic constraint systems (but without variable origina-
tion) is undecidable. Here is another constraint system, where variable origination is satisfied, but 
monotony is not. It can be used for reducing the halting problem again:
{{⊥}✄ x, {q1(⊥,⊥, x)}✄ qn(⊥,⊥, y)} .
As a consequence, satisfiability of constraint systems with variable origination (but without mono-
tonicity) is undecidable.
We should note by contrast (see Baudet, 2005) that constraint solving in subterm convergent the-
ories is decidable if the constraint system S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n satisfies both variable origination and 
monotonicity. Moreover, the problem of constraint system satisfiability for a subterm deduction sys-
tem encoding a Deterministic Turing Machine as above can be reduced to the problem of constraint 
system satisfiability within a subterm convergent equational theory.
If we consider a Universal Turing Machine3 with a single final state qn and that halts with an 
empty tape if and only if the Turing Machine with the given code terminates on the given input, then 
by reusing the encoding above we will obtain a fixed subterm deduction system DU for which the 
following problem is undecidable:
Instance: A constraint system C .
Question: is C satisfiable within DU ?
This is due to the fact that the halting problem of a TM with code TMcode on input Input is 
encoded into solving the following constraint:
{q1(⊥, TMcode+ Input, x)}✄ qn(⊥,⊥, y).
3 Thanks to R. Küsters for the idea.
Appendix B. Proofs
B.1. Proof of Lemma 12
By induction on |Sub (t)|.
• |Sub (t)| = 1, implies t = a ∈A and then elems (a)= {a}, i.e. the equality becomes trivial.
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k > 1), H (t)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (p) holds.
• Given a term t : |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1. We should prove H (t)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (p).
· t = priv (t1) or t = bin (p,q). In both cases, elems (t)= {t}, and thus, he equality is trivial.
· t = · (L). Note that ∀s ∈ L, |Sub (s)| < k. Then, on one hand, H (· (L)) =
⋃
p∈L H (p) =
(by induction hypothesis)=
⋃
p∈L
⋃
p′∈elems(p) H
(
p′
)
. On the other hand, 
⋃
p∈elems(·(L)) H (p)=⋃
p∈
⋃
p′∈L elems(p
′) H (p)=
⋃
p′∈L
⋃
p∈elems(p′) H (p). Thus, H (t)=
⋃
p∈elems(t) H (p).
B.2. Proof of Lemma 6
First we prove that elems (t)⊆ QSub (t). We use a proof by induction on |Sub (t)|.
• If root (t) 6= ·, then elems (t)= {t} ⊆ QSub (t). This case includes all t such that |Sub (t)| = 1. Thus
we need to consider only t = · (L).
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k ≥ 1), the statement holds.
• If for some t we have |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1, then elems (t) =
⋃
p∈L elems (p) and QSub (t) =
{t}
⋃
p∈L QSub (p). And since |Sub (p)|< k using the induction supposition we obtain the wanted 
statement.
Now we show that QSub (t)⊆ Sub (t). Again, applying proof by induction on |Sub (t)| we have:
• If |Sub (t)| = 1, then QSub (t)= Sub (t)= {t}.
• Suppose that for any t : |Sub (t)|< k (k ≥ 1), the statement holds.
• If for some t we have |Sub (t)| = k, k > 1, then
· t = bin (t1, t2).Then QSub (t)= {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2) and Sub (t)= {t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2),
where max{|Sub (t1)| , |Sub (t2)|} < k. And then using induction supposition we can conclude
for this case.
· t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
· t = · (t1, . . . , tm). Then we have QSub (t) = {t} ∪
⋃
p∈elems(t1,...,tm)
QSub (p) ⊆ (using the al-
ready proved part of the property) ⊆ {t} ∪
⋃
p∈QSub({t1,...,tm})
QSub (p) = (as QSub (QSub (t)) =
QSub (t)) = {t} ∪
⋃
p∈{t1,...,tm}
QSub (p) ⊆ (using induction supposition, as ∀i |Sub (ti)| < k) ⊆
{t} ∪
⋃
p∈{t1,...,tm}
Sub (p)= Sub (t).
B.3. Proof of Proposition 12
As was stated before, the measure of the problem input is measure (S) = n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)|,
where S = {E i ✄ ti}i=1,...,n .
Algorithm 1 returns a normalized proof σ for the decision problem if it exists. Moreover, 
|Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (S)| for any x ∈ Vars (S).
First, we will normalize Sσ . From Lemma 21 follows, that we can do it for the time Tpq ≤
Ppq(measure (Sσ )), where Ppq is some polynomial with non-negative coefficients of some degree 
m′′ > 0.
From § 3.3 we know that checking the derivability of a normalized ground term g from a 
set of normalized ground terms G takes a polynomial time (depending on |Sub (G ∪ {g})|). That 
is, there exists a polynomial P g with non-negative coefficients, such that the number of opera-
tions (execution time) to verify the derivability (g from G) will be limited by P g(|Sub (G ∪ {g})|). 
Then the execution time for checking a set of ground constraints {G i ✄ gi}i=1,...,n will be limited by ∑n
i=1 P g(|Sub (G i ∪ {gi})|).
To prove that the algorithm is in NP we need to show that the execution time for checking a 
solution is polynomially limited by the input measure, i.e. there exists a polynomial P , such that the 
execution time does not exceed O (P (n × |Sub (S)| + |E (S)|)) steps.
In our case, the execution time T of a check will be T = Tpq + T val + T g , where T val is the time 
needed to check the validity of terms in Sσ , and T g is the time needed for checking ground derivabil-
ity of Sσ : T g ≤
∑n
i=1 P g(|Sub (p(E i ∪ {ti})σq)|). As P g is a polynomial, let us say, of degree m
′ > 0, 
with non-negative coefficients, we can use the fact that for any positive integers x1, . . . , xk we have ∑k
i=1 P g(xi) ≤ P g(
∑k
i=1 xi). Then we have T g ≤ P g(
∑n
i=1 |Sub (p(E i ∪ {ti})σq)|) and by Lemma 22 we 
have T g ≤ P g(
∑n
i=1 |Sub ((E i ∪ {ti})σ )|); using the same lemma, we have
T g ≤ P g
(
n∑
i=1
(
|Sub (E i ∪ {ti})| + |Sub
(⋃
x
xσ
)
|
))
≤
≤ P g
(
n∑
i=1
(
|Sub (E i)| + |Sub (ti)| +
∑
x
|Sub (xσ )|
))
≤
≤ P g
(
n∑
i=1
(2× |Sub (S)|)+ n×
∑
x
(|Sub (xσ )|)
)
≤
≤ P g
(
2× n× |Sub (S)| + n×
∑
x
(2× |Sub (S)|)
)
≤
≤ P g
(
2× n× |Sub (S)| + 2× n× (|Sub (S)|)2
)
≤
≤ P g
(
4× n× (|Sub (S)|)2
)
≤ P g
(
4× (n× |Sub (S)| + |E (S)|)2
)
=
= O
(
(measure (S))2m
′
)
.
On the other hand, let us consider Tpq . We have Tpq ≤ Ppq(n ×|Sub (Sσ )|+|E (Sσ )|). One can see 
that the number of edges in DAG-representation of Sσ (where every variable x of S is replaced by 
xσ ) will not exceed the number of edges in S plus the number of edges of all xσ : |E (Sσ )| ≤ |E (S)| +∑
x∈Vars(S)|E (xσ )|. And since σ is normalized, we can use Lemma 20: Tpq ≤ Ppq(n × |Sub (Sσ )| +
|E (S)| +
∑
x∈Vars(S)(|Sub (xσ )|)
2).
Then, using Lemma 5 we obtain Sub (Sσ ) = Sub (S)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (S)σ ), and thus, |Sub (Sσ )| ≤
|Sub (S)σ | +
∑
x∈Vars(S) |Sub (xσ )|. From ∀T ⊆ T , |Tσ | ≤ |T | follows |Sub (S)σ | ≤ |Sub (S)|. Since 
|Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 ×|Sub (S)| and |Vars (S)| ≤ |Sub (S)|, we obtain |Sub (Sσ )| ≤ |Sub (S)|+2 ×(|Sub (S)|)2 . 
In the same way, 
∑
x∈Vars(S)(|Sub (xσ )|)
2 ≤ |Sub (S)| × (2 × |Sub (S)|)2 . Therefore, Tpq ≤ Ppq(n ×
(|Sub (S)| + 2 × (|Sub (S)|)2) + |E (S)| + |Sub (S)| × (2 × |Sub (S)|)2) = O  
(
(measure (S))3m
′′
)
.
Note that once Sσ is normalized, the validity can be checked in linear time T val=O  (measure (Sσ)). 
Using the same reasoning as for Tpq , we obtain T val = O (measure (S)
3).
Summing up, T = O  
(
(measure (S))3m
′′
+ (measure (S))2m
′
+ (measure (S))3
)
. This shows that 
checking a solution returned by the algorithm takes polynomial time, giving the expected complexity.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider all the cases of DY+ ACI rules:
• t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q We have two cases:
· ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then we have π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) =
π(H (pair (pt1q ,pt2q))) = π({pair (π(H (pt1q)),π(H (pt2q)))}) = ppair (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2)))q
and then π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))}).
· ∄u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then (by definition, Lemma 13 and Lemma 10)
π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) = π(H (pt1q)∪H (pt2q)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)∪ H (t2)q). By Lemma 10, pH (t1)q⊆
Der ({π(H (t1))}) and pH (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (t2))}), then by Lemma 14, pH (t1)q ∪ pH (t2)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (t1))} ∪ {π(H (t2))}). Now, by applying Lemma 14, we have π(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈
Der ({π(H (t1))} ∪ {π(H (t2))}).
So, in this case π(H (r)) ∈ Der ({π(H (l1)),π(H (l2))}).
• t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of previous one.
• {t1, t2}→ paenc (t1, t2)q. The same.
• t1,priv (t2)→ psig (t1,priv (t2))q.
· ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q= puσq. Then
π(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) = π(H (sig (t1,priv (t2)))) =
π({sig (π(H (pt1q)),π(H (ppriv (t2)q)))}) = psig (π(H (t1)),priv (π(H (t2))))q and then
π(H (psig (t1,priv (t2))q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1)),π(H (priv (t2)))}) (as
π(H (priv (t2))) = priv (π(H (t2)))).
· ∄u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that psig (t1,priv (t2))q= puσq. This case can be proved in similar way as
done for {t1, t2}→ ppair (t1, t2)q.
• t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
On one hand, π(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) = π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm))) = π(H (t1)∪· · ·∪H (tm)) ∈Der(pH (t1)∪
· · · ∪ H (tm)q). On the other hand, pH (ti)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (ti))}). And thus, by Lemma 14,
π(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) ∈ Der ({π(H (t1)), . . . ,π(H (tm))}).
• enc (t1, t2) ,pt2q → pt1q. Here we have to show that π(H (pt1q)) is derivable from
{π(H (enc (t1, t2))),π(H (pt2q))}. Consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q= puσq.
Then π(H (enc (t1, t2))) = enc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))), and π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({enc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) ,pπ(H (pt2q))q}).
· ∄u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q= puσq.
Then π(H (enc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)). From Lemma 10, we have pH (t1)∪ H (t2)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (enc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (enc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Lemma 10
we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, we have
π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (enc (t1, t2)))).
• aenc (t1, t2) ,ppriv (t2)q → pt1q. Here we have to show that π(H (pt1q)) is derivable from
{π(H (aenc (t1, t2))),π(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q= puσq.
Then π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))), and then π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({aenc (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) ,ppriv (π(H (t2)))q}). Meanwhile,
π(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = π(H (priv (t2))) = π({priv (π(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (π(H (t2)))q.
· ∄u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then π(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)).
By Lemma 10 we have pH (t1)∪ H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q).
Therefore, by Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Here, as usual, we consider two cases:
· ∃u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q= puσq.
Then π(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pair (π(H (t1)),π(H (t2))) and then π(H (pt1q)) = pπ(H (t1))q ∈
Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}).
· ∄u ∈ ˚Sub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then π(H (pair (t1, t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)).
Then by Lemma 10 we obtain pH (t1)∪ H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}), thus pH (t1)q ⊆
Der ({π(H (pair (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Lemma 10 we have that π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q).
Therefore, by Lemma 14, π(H (pt1q)) = π(H (t1)) ∈ Der (π(H (pair (t1, t2)))).
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Proof like above.
• · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq. We have π(H (· (t1, . . . , t2))) = π(H (t1) ∪ · · · ∪ H (tm)). Then by Lemma 10,
pH (t1)∪ · · · ∪ H (tm)q ⊆ Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))); thus pH (ti)q ⊆ Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))).
As π(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pH (ti)q), by Lemma 14 we have π(H (ptiq)) = π(H (ti)) ∈
Der (π(H (· (t1, . . . , t2)))).
As all possible cases satisfy lemma conditions, we proved the lemma.
B.5. Proof of Lemma 22
First, we show an auxiliary statement:
Lemma 25. For any term t, ∀s ∈ Sub (ptq)∃s′ ∈ Sub (t) : s = ps′q
Proof. Suppose the opposite and let us take s ∈ Sub (ptq) with maximal |Sub (s)| that does not satisfy 
the desired property. Note that the “biggest” term in Sub (ptq), i.e. ptq, does satisfy the property, as 
we can choose s′ = t ∈ Sub (t). By definition of Sub (·) if s ∈ Sub (ptq) and s 6= ptq then ∃r ∈ Sub (ptq)
such that
• r = bin (p, s) or r = bin (s, p) or r = priv (s). Without loss of generality we consider only the first
case (r = bin (p, s)) as other ones are similar. As |Sub (r)|> |Sub (s)|, there exists r′ ∈ Sub (t) such
that r = pr′q. By definition of p·q:
· either r′ = bin
(
p′, s′
)
and pp′q = p and ps′q = s. As s′ ∈ Sub
(
r′
)
⊆ Sub (t) the property is 
proved.
· or r′ = · (L) and pelems (L)q = {r}. Since ∀q ∈ elems (L) , root (q) 6= ·, then ∃q ∈ elems (L) : q =
bin
(
p′, s′
)
and pp′q= p and ps′q= s. Using Lemma 6 we have s′ ∈ Sub (t).
• r = · (L) and s ∈ L. Then (since |Sub (r)| > |Sub (s)|) we have ∃r′ ∈ Sub (t) : pr′q = r. Thus r is
normalized (r = pr′q = ppr′qq = prq), and thus, root (s) 6= ·. Then by definition of p·q we have 
r′ = ·
(
L′
)
and L ≈ pelems
(
L′
)
q, and thus, s ∈ pelems
(
L′
)
q, that is ∃s′ ∈ elems
(
L′
)
: s = ps′q. Using
again Lemma 6 we have s′ ∈ Sub (t). ✷
Then, using Lemma 25 and the fact that p·q is deterministic, we obtain ∀p, q ∈ Sub (ptq) p 6=
q ∃p′, q′ ∈ Sub (t) : p = pp′q∧ q = pq′q∧ p 6= q. And thus, |Sub (ptq)| ≤ |Sub (t)|.
B.6. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that if σ ′ is a model of S then pσ ′q is a model of S and pσ ′q is
a model of pSq. Then, there exists a substitution θ : dom (θ)= dom
(
pσ ′q
)
, img (θ)⊆ dom (θ) , σ ′′ =
pσ ′q |img(θ) (where θ |V is a substitution obtained from θ by narrowing its domain to set V ) and 
σ ′′ is a model of pSq θ such that xσ ′′ 6= yσ ′′ , if x 6= y (this is true because we can show how to
build θ : given the pσ ′q — simply split dom
(
pσ ′q
)
into the classes of equivalence modulo pσ ′q, i.e. 
x ≡ y ⇐⇒ x pσ ′q= y pσ ′q; for every class choose one representative [x]≡, and then xθ = [x]≡). Note 
that θσ ′′ = σ ′ , that’s why σ ′′ is a model of pSq θ .
Then, as σ ′′ is a model of pSq θ , using Proposition 1, we can say that σ ′′ is a model of ppSq θq.
Moreover, xσ ′′ 6= yσ ′′ , if ∀x, y ∈ dom
(
σ ′′
)
x 6= y and σ ′′ is normalized. Then, we can apply Corollary 6,
which gives us existence of conservative model δ of ppSq θq. That is why we can apply Proposition 7: 
∀x ∈ Vars (ppSq θq) , |Sub (xδ)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (ppSq θq)|.
Note that using Proposition 1, Lemma 19 and definition of “model”, we can easily show that 
δ[θ] is a model of pSq. Moreover, δ[θ] is normalized. By definition of δ[θ] we can say that 
∀x ∈ dom (δ[θ]) ∃y ∈ dom (θ) θ : xδ[θ] = yδ and as y ∈ X (by definition of θ ), then |Sub (xδ[θ])| =
|Sub (yδ)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (ppSq θq)| ≤ 2 × |Sub (pSq θ)|. Applying Lemma 18, we have |Sub (xδ[θ])| ≤
2 × |Sub (pSq)|.
Summing up, we have a normalized model σ = δ[θ] of pSq such that for any x ∈ dom (σ ) we have 
|Sub (xσ )| ≤ 2 × |Sub (pSq)|. ✷
References
Amadio, Roberto M., Lugiez, Denis, 2000. On the reachability problem in cryptographic protocols. In: Concurrency Theory, 11th
International Conference. University Park, PA, USA, August 22–25, 2000. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1877.
Springer, pp. 380–394.
Arapinis, Myrto, Duflot, Marie, 2007. Bounding messages for free in security protocols. In: Foundations of Software Technology
and Theoretical Computer Science, 27th International Conference. New Delhi, India. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 4855. Springer, pp. 376–387.
Armando, Alessandro, Carbone, Roberto, Compagna, Luca, 2014. SATMC: a SAT-based model checker for security-critical systems.
In: Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems – 20th International Conference. TACAS. In: Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8413. Springer, pp. 31–45.
Avanesov, Tigran, 2011. Resolution of constraint systems for automatic composition of security-aware Web services. Thesis.
Université Henri Poincaré, Nancy I. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00641237.
Avanesov, Tigran, Chevalier, Yannick, Rusinowitch, Michael, Turuani, Mathieu, 2010. Satisfiability of general intruder constraints
with a set constructor. In: 2010 Fifth International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems. CRiSIS, pp. 1–8.
Avanesov, Tigran, Chevalier, Yannick, Anis Mekki, Mohammed, Rusinowitch, Michaël, Turuani, Mathieu, 2012. Distributed orches-
tration of web services under security constraints. In: Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security –
6th International Workshop, DPM 2011, and 4th International Workshop, SETOP 2011. Leuven, Belgium, September 15–16,
2011. In: Revised Selected Papers, vol. 7122. Springer, pp. 235–252.
Baader, Franz, Nipkow, Tobias, 1998. Term Rewriting and All That. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA.
Basin, David, Mödersheim, Sebastian, Viganò, Luca, 2005. Algebraic intruder deductions. In: 12th International Conference on
Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning. LPAR. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3835.
Springer, pp. 549–564.
Baskar, Anguraj, Ramanujam, Ramaswamy, Suresh, S.P., 2010. A dexptime-complete Dolev–Yao theory with distributive encryp-
tion. In: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2010, 35th International Symposium. MFCS 2010, Brno, Czech
Republic, August 23–27. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6281. Springer, pp. 102–113.
Baudet, Mathieu, 2005. Deciding security of protocols against off-line guessing attacks. In: ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. ACM, pp. 16–25.
Blanchet, Bruno, 2009. Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols. J. Comput. Secur. 17 (4), 363–434.
Bursuc, Sergiu, Comon-Lundh, Hubert, Delaune, Stéphanie, 2007. Associative-commutative deducibility constraints. In: Proceed-
ings of the 24th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. STACS’07. In: Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 4393. Springer, pp. 634–645.
Chevalier, Yannick, Rusinowitch, Michaël, 2005. Combining intruder theories. In: Caires, Luís, Italiano, Giuseppe F., Monteiro,
Luís, Palamidessi, Catuscia, Yung, Moti (Eds.), 32nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Proceedings. ICALP 2005, Lisbon, Portugal, July 11–15, 2005. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3580. Springer,
pp. 639–651.
Chevalier, Yannick, Rusinowitch, Michael, 2010. Symbolic protocol analysis in the union of disjoint intruder theories: combin-
ing decision procedures. In: ICALP 2005 – Track C: Security and Cyptography Foundations. Theor. Comput. Sci. 411 (10),
1261–1282. http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/DOI:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.10.022.
Chevalier, Yannick, Küsters, Ralf, Rusinowitch, Michaël, Turuani, Mathieu, 2005. An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity
with XOR. Theor. Comput. Sci. 338 (1–3), 247–274.
Chevalier, Yannick, Lugiez, Denis, Rusinowitch, Michaël, 2007. Towards an automatic analysis of web service security. In: FroCoS
2007. Liverpool, UK, September 10–12. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4720. Springer, pp. 133–147.
Chevalier, Yannick, Küsters, Ralf, Rusinowitch, Michaël, Turuani, Mathieu, 2008. Complexity results for security protocols with
Diffie–Hellman exponentiation and commuting public key encryption. ACM Trans. Comput. Log. 9, 4.
Comon-Lundh, Hubert, 2004. Intruder theories. In: FoSSaCS. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2987. Springer, pp. 1–4.
Comon-Lundh, Hubert, Shmatikov, Vitaly, 2003. Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of
exclusive or. In: Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, p. 271.
Cortier, Véronique, Delaune, Stéphanie, 2012. Decidability and combination results for two notions of knowledge in security
protocols. J. Autom. Reason. 48 (4), 441–487. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10817-010-9208-8.
Delaune, Stéphanie, 2006. Vérification des protocoles cryptographiques et propriétés algébriques. Thèse de doctorat. Laboratoire
Spécification et Vérification, ENS Cachan, France. http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/these-delaune.pdf.
Delaune, Stéphanie, Lafourcade, Pascal, Lugiez, Denis, Treinen, Ralf, 2008. Symbolic protocol analysis for monoidal equational
theories. Inf. Comput. 206 (2–4), 312–351. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2007.07.005.
Dougherty, Daniel J., Guttman, Joshua D., 2013. An algebra for symbolic Diffie–Hellman protocol analysis. In: Trustworthy
Global Computing – 7th International Symposium. TGC 2012. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8191. Springer,
pp. 164–181.
Erbatur, Serdar, Marshall, Andrew M., Kapur, Deepak, Narendran, Paliath, 2011. Unification over distributive exponentiation
(sub)theories. J. Autom. Lang. Comb. 16 (2–4), 109–140.
Escobar, Santiago, Kapur, Deepak, Lynch, Christopher, Meadows, Catherine, Meseguer, José, Narendran, Paliath, Sasse, Ralf, 2011.
Protocol analysis in Maude-NPA using unification modulo homomorphic encryption. In: Schneider-Kamp, Peter, Hanus,
Michael (Eds.), PPDP. ACM, pp. 65–76.
Fiazza, Maria-Camilla, Peroli, Michele, Viganò, Luca, 2012. An environmental paradigm for defending security protocols. In: 2012
International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems. CTS 2012, Denver, CO, USA„ May 21–25, 2012. IEEE,
pp. 427–438.
Groza, Bogdan, Minea, Marius, 2013. Bridging Dolev–Yao adversaries and control systems with time-sensitive channels. In: Criti-
cal Information Infrastructures Security – 8th International Workshop. CRITIS 2013, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September
16–18. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8328. Springer, pp. 167–178.
Guttman, Joshua D., 2007. How to do things with cryptographic protocols. In: Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. 12th
Asian Computing Science Conference on Computer and Network Security, Proceedings. Doha, Qatar, December 9–11, 2007.
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4846. Springer.
Kassem, Ali, Lafourcade, Pascal, Lakhnech, Yassine, Mödersheim, Sebastian, 2013. Verifiability in e-auction protocols & brandt’s
protocol revisited. In: 1st Workshop on Hot Issues in Security Principles and Trust. HotSpot’13.
Küsters, Ralf, Truderung, Tomasz, 2008. Reducing protocol analysis with XOR to the XOR-free case in the horn theory based
approach. In: Peng Ning, Syverson, Paul F., Jha, Somesh (Eds.), ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
ACM, pp. 129–138.
Liu, Zhiqiang, Lynch, Christopher, 2011. Efficient general unification for XOR with homomorphism. In: Automated Deduction –
CADE-23 – 23rd International Conference on Automated Deduction, Proceedings. Wroclaw, Poland, July 31–August 5. In:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6803. Springer, pp. 407–421.
Lynch, Christopher, Meadows, Catherine, 2004. Sound approximations to Diffie–Hellman using rewrite rules. In: ICICS. In: Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3269. Springer, pp. 262–277.
Malladi, Sreekanth, 2012. Soundness of removing cancellation identities in protocol analysis under exclusive-or. In: Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 6993. Springer, pp. 205–224.
Mazaré, Laurent, 2005. Satisfiability of Dolev–Yao constraints. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 125 (1), 109–124.
Mazaré, Laurent, 2006. Computational soundness of symbolic models for cryptographic protocols. Ph.D. dissertation. Institut
National Polytechnique de Grenoble. http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/these-mazare.pdf.
Meadows, Catherine, 2011. Theorem proving and security. In: van Tilborg, Henk C.A., Jajodia, Sushil (Eds.), Encyclopedia of
Cryptography and Security, 2nd ed. Springer, pp. 1285–1287.
Mödersheim, Sebastian, Nielson, Flemming, Riis Nielson, Hanne, 2013. Lazy mobile intruders. In: Principles of Security and
Trust – Second International Conference, POST 2013, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice
of Software, Proceedings. ETAPS 2013, Rome, Italy, March 16–24, 2013. In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7796.
Springer, pp. 147–166.
OWASP Foundation, 2008. OWASP-DV-008, OWASP Testing Guide, v3.0. http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_XML_
Injection_(OWASP-DV-008).
Rusinowitch, Michaël, Turuani, Mathieu, 2003. Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-
complete. Theor. Comput. Sci. 1–3 (299), 451–475.
Syverson, Paul, Meadows, Catherine, Cervesato, Iliano, 2000. Dolev–Yao is no better than Machiavelli. In: First Workshop on
Issues in the Theory of Security. WITS’00, pp. 87–92.
Turuani, Mathieu, 2006. The CL-Atse protocol analyser. In: Term Rewriting and Applications (RTA). In: Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 4098. Springer, pp. 277–286.
Viganò, Luca, 2012. Automated validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures with the AVANTSSAR platform.
In: International Conference on High Performance Computing & Simulation. HPCS 2012, Madrid. IEEE, pp. 444–447.
